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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN P. SAMPSON, 
Plaintiff, Appellant, 
and Cross-Respondent, 
and 
MILTON R. GOFF, individually 
and as trustee of MILTON R. 
GOFF TRUST, an unincorporated 
association, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs . 
PAUL H. RICHINS; RICHTRON, 
INC., a Utah corporation; 
RICHTRON FINANCIAL CORPORA-
TION, a Utah corporation; 
RICHTRON GENERAL, a Utah 
corporation; and FRONTIER 
INVESTMENTS, a Utah corpor-
ation, 
Defendants, Respondents 
and Cross-Appellants. 
Case No. 860565 and 
860570 
eneral and Richtron Financial 
be referred to collectively 
STATEMENT OF 
Respondents, Paul H. R 
Inc. ("Richtron, Inc. " ) , Rich 
("Richtron Financial"), and f 
General") (collectively, the 
generally the statement of the 
John P. Sampson ("Sampson"). H 
Richtron, Inc., Richtron G 
will sometimes hereinafter 
as the "Richtron Companies. 
THE CASE 
Rich ins ("Richins"), Richtron, 
htron Financial Corporation 
Richtron General ("Richtron 
"Rich ins Parties") 1, accept 
case set forth by appellant, 
owever, the proper determina-
tion of t h i s appeal r e q u i r e s S a m p s o n ' s s t a t e m e n t to be 
clarified and supplemented in several important respects. 
F i r s t , as S a m p s o n a c c u r a t e l y states, the original 
complaint in this case was filed in the n a m e of R o b e r t J. 
Osborn ("Osborn") for the ostensible purpose of enforcing in 
the State of Utah a judgment obtained by Osborn (the "Osborn 
J u d g m e n t " ) a g a i n s t the R i c h i n s P a r t i e s in the S t a t e of 
O r e g o n . H o w e v e r , S a m p s o n f a i l s to s t a t e that the O s b o r n 
J u d g m e n t was one of the m a n y l i t i g a t i o n matters for which 
the R i c h i n s P a r t i e s r e t a i n e d S a m p s o n to p r o t e c t t h e i r 
i n t e r e s t s (R. 2 0 7 9 , 2 0 8 3 ; Exhibits 64 and 6 7 ) ; that rather 
t h a n n e g o t i a t i n g a c o m p r o m i s e d s e t t l e m e n t of the O s b o r n 
J u d g m e n t as r e q u e s t e d by the R i c h i n s P a r t i e s , S a m p s o n 
p u r c h a s e d in his own n a m e the O s b o r n J u d g m e n t for the 
p u r p o s e of b r i n g i n g suit a g a i n s t his f o r m e r c l i e n t s , the 
R i c h i n s P a r t i e s (R. 2 0 5 0 - 5 1 , 2 0 5 8 - 5 9 ) ; that a f t e r the 
R i c h i n s P a r t i e s w e r e served with the summons and complaint 
in this case, they learned from Osborn that he had previous-
ly sold the O s b o r n J u d g m e n t to S a m p s o n and a s s e r t e d no 
f u r t h e r i n t e r e s t in the j u d g m e n t (R. 2 0 5 1 ) ; that upon 
d i s c o v e r i n g that fact, the Richins Parties moved to dismiss 
the action on the basis that it was not being p r o s e c u t e d in 
the name of the real party in interest Jjd.; that in response 
to that m o t i o n , S a m p s o n a d m i t t e d that he had acquired the 
Osborn Judgment and was i n d e e d the real p a r t y in i n t e r e s t 
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Id.; and, that the p r i m a r y p u r p o s e for w h i c h S a m p s o n 
purchased the Osborn Judgment was to preserve claims against 
his former clients in his ongoing efforts to take control of 
the t w e n t y - f i v e l i m i t e d p a r t n e r s h i p s in w h i c h e i t h e r 
R i c h t r o n , I n c . or R i c h t r o n G e n e r a l was the sole g e n e r a l 
p a r t n e r ( c o l l e c t i v e l y , the " L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p s " ) (R. 
2 0 5 8 - 5 9 ) . 
In a d d i t i o n , it is i m p o r t a n t to u n d e r s t a n d that 
during the summer of 1 9 8 2 , Sampson was in f r e q u e n t c o n t a c t 
with the United States Internal Revenue Service (the "IRS") 
for the purpose of providing it with i n f o r m a t i o n r e g a r d i n g 
the i n t e r n a l s t r u c t u r e and b u s i n e s s affairs of his former 
c l i e n t s , the Rich ins P a r t i e s . ^ With that assistance, the 
IRS conducted a public a u c t i o n in O c t o b e r , 1982 to sell a 
n u m b e r of a s s e t s of t h e Richtron Companies (R. 2125-26 ) . 
Sampson, a p p e a r i n g on b e h a l f of s e v e r a l i n v e s t o r s in the 
L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p s , submitted the highest bid and thereby 
a p p a r e n t l y ^ a c q u i r e d s u b s t a n t i a l l y all of the a s s e t s of 
The e x h i b i t on w h i c h t h i s fact is b a s e d c o n s i s t s of 
c e r t a i n m i n u t e s of a l i m i t e d p a r t n e r s h i p m e e t i n g 
c o n d u c t e d by S a m p s o n in J u n e , 1 9 8 2 . That e x h i b i t , 
however, was contained in a box of d o c u m e n t s p r e v i o u s l y 
on f i l e w i t h the Weber County Court Clerk -- a box that 
is now i n e x p l i c a b l y m i s s i n g . T h e r e f o r e , the R i c h ins 
P a r t i e s are not now a b l e to c i t e that e x h i b i t to the 
record. 
A f t e r the IRS s a l e , t h e Rich ins P a r t i e s s o u g h t and 
obtained from the United States D i s t r i c t C o u r t for the 
D i s t r i c t of Utah in proceedings entitled Richtron, Inc. 
et . a l . v. J o h n P. S a m p s o n , e t . a l . , an order voiding 
the s a l e on the g r o u n d s that the IRS failed to comply 
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the R i c h t r o n C o m p a n i e s . _I_d. S h o r t l y thereafter, Sampson 
i s s u e d a t h r e a t to the Richins Parties' legal counsel that 
u n l e s s c o u n s e l p e r m a n e n t l y c e a s e d his r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , 
S a m p s o n w o u l d seek " s a n c t i o n s " and u n s p e c i f i e d " o t h e r " 
relief a g a i n s t h i m . (R. 2 1 3 1 - 3 2 , 2 2 3 1 - 3 2 ) . T h e d i s t r i c t 
c o u r t c o n c l u d e d that S a m p s o n ' s t h r e a t was " b i z a r r e " and 
constituted "unprofessional conduct." Id. 
N e x t , in his s t a t e m e n t , S a m p s o n a p p e a r s to t a k e 
s u b s t a n t i a l c o m f o r t from the fact that the d i s c i p l i n a r y 
c o m m i t t e e of the Utah S t a t e Bar A s s o c i a t i o n issued only a 
private reprimand against him for his conduct in this c a s e . 
He a s s e r t s that a " . . . m o r e s e v e r e penalty was unwarranted 
since in the committee's o p i n i o n t h e r e was no d i s h o n e s t y , 
d e c e i t or bad m o t i v e . . . " ( B r i e f , p . 4 ) . O b v i o u s l y , no 
portion of the committee's proceedings is, or has ever been, 
a part of the record on which the district court entered its 
findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment. And, the 
s t a t u t o r y i n a b i l i t y of the Richins Parties to confront and 
cross-examine Sampson in those disciplinary p r o c e e d i n g s , and 
t h e r e b y e l u c i d a t e the n u a n c e s of his ethically proscribed 
conduct, extinguishes t h e p r o b a t i v e v a l u e , if a n y , of the 
committee's c o n c l u s i o n s . 
w i t h s e v e r a l r e q u i r e m e n t s g o v e r n i n g the sale of a 
taxpayer ' s assets . 
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F i n a l l y , d e s p i t e t h e f a c t t h a t Sampson i s seek ing 
t h i s c o u r t ' s r e v i e w o f t h e f a c t u a l p r e d i c a t e s on w h i c h t h e 
d i s t r i c t c o u r t based i t s award of damages, Sampson o r d e r e d 
t r a n s c r i p t s o f t he t e s t i m o n y o f o n l y 14 o f t he 23 w i t n e s s e s 
at t r i a l . See A f f i d a v i t of John T. Anderson dated September 
1 8 , 1 9 8 7 . He a l s o o r d e r e d t r a n s c r i p t s of t he t e s t i m o n y of 
t h e R i c h i n s P a r t i e s ' p r i m a r y w i t n e s s - - R i c h i n s - - o n l y t o 
t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h a t t e s t i m o n y was adduced by Sampson's own 
c o u n s e l . _I_d . He nowhere d e s i g n a t e d f o r i n c l u s i o n i n t he 
r e c o r d t h e 15 h o u r s o f d i r e c t e x a m i n a t i o n o f R i c h i n s by 
R i c h i n s ' l e g a l c o u n s e l . j _ d . T h u s , Sampson d e s i g n a t e d f o r 
i n c l u s i o n i n t h e r e c o r d t h e t e s t i m o n y of o n l y some of t he 
w i t n e s s e s whom he c a l l e d and he t o t a l l y o m i t t e d t o i n c l u d e 
t h e t e s t i m o n y o f any o f t h e w i t n e s s e s c a l l e d by t he Ri c h i n s 
P a r t i e s . 
A c c o r d i n g l y , t h i s c o u r t l a t e r p r o h i b i t e d Sampson 
f rom s e e k i n g t o d e s i g n a t e any a d d i t i o n a l p o r t i o n s o f t h e 
r e c o r d . ( B r i e f , p . 3 ) . At t h e o r a l argument on the R i c h i n s 
P a r t i e s ' renewed m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s Sampson ' s a p p e a l , 
Sampson's counse l acknowledged t o t h e c o u r t t h a t the p a r t i a l 
p o r t i o n s o f t h e r e c o r d t i m e l y o r d e r e d by Sampson were 
" t o t a l l y i n a d e q u a t e " t o p e r m i t m e a n i n g f u l r e v i e w o f t h e 
judgment Sampson now seeks t o have r e v e r s e d . 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. The S t r u c t u r e And Status Of The Richtron Empire Between 
1973 And May, 1980: The Pre-Sampson Years, 
B e t w e e n O c t o b e r 1973 and March, 1980, Rich ins, as 
president of the Richtron Companies established 29 l i m i t e d 
p a r t n e r s h i p s for the p u r p o s e of a c q u i r i n g , o p e r a t i n g and 
holding for resale farm properties located in the s t a t e s of 
U t a h , Idaho and O r e g o n . (R. 2 0 6 8 ) . 4 Each of the Limited 
P a r t n e r s h i p s was e v i d e n c e d by a w r i t t e n a g r e e m e n t u n d e r 
w h i c h e i t h e r R i c h t r o n , Inc. or Richtron General was desig-
nated as the sole general partner. (R. 2068; Exhibit 1 1 5 ) . 
The a g r e e m e n t s provided in pertinent part that fi) 
the general partner was vested with e x c l u s i v e a u t h o r i t y to 
m a n a g e and c o n d u c t the affairs of the Limited Partnerships 
(R. 2068-69; Exhibit 1 1 5 ) ; (ii) the l i m i t e d p a r t n e r s w e r e 
prohibited from taking part in the conduct or control of the 
Limited Partnerships 1 affairs J_d.; (iii) each of the limited 
p a r t n e r s was r e q u i r e d to contribute annually, in cash, to 
the capital of the Limited P a r t n e r s h i p s his pro rata s h a r e 
of the f u n d s n e c e s s a r y to pay the annual e x p e n s e s of the 
L i m i t e d Partnerships _I_d.; (iv) the Limited Partnerships had 
a designated term of the earlier of (a) twenty years, or (b) 
the w i t h d r a w a l of the g e n e r a l p a r t n e r , the d i s t r i b u t i o n , 
Of t h o s e 29 limited partnerships, only 25 were targeted 
for t a k e o v e r by S a m p s o n ; a c c o r d i n g l y , no c l a i m s w e r e 
a s s e r t e d in the a c t i o n with r e s p e c t to the o t h e r 4 
limited partnerships. 
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sale or abandonment of all Limited Partnership assets or the 
affirmative vote of not less than a majority in i n t e r e s t of 
the limited partners to remove the incumbent general partner 
and e l e c t a new g e n e r a l partner ld_.; and, (v) the primary 
asset of each of the L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p s c o n s i s t e d of 
agricultural property p u r c h a s e d on c o n t r a c t by one of the 
Richtron Companies and resold to the Limited Partnerships at 
a disclosed profit. (Brief, pp. 7, 8; R. 2 2 6 8 ) . 
D u r i n g the seven year period in which the Richtron 
Companies m a n a g e d and o p e r a t e d the L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p s , 
none of the L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p s ' property was ever fore-
closed u p o n . (R. 2 1 2 8 - 2 9 , 2 1 5 7 - 5 8 , 2 2 2 8 ) . In late M a y , 
1980, Sampson and two of his limited partner clients offered 
to purchase the capital stock of the Richtron C o m p a n i e s for 
$ 7 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 . (R. 2049, 2077-78, 2 1 4 1 ) . Accordingly, as the 
district court concluded: 
As f l o u n d e r i n g as the partnerships were, 
S a m p s o n saw v a l u e [of at least 
$ 7 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ] t h e r e and spent what now 
totals six years in achieving what he now 
h a s , w h a t e v e r it may b e , leaving Rich ins 
and his companies with no t a n g i b l e a s s e t s 
or values . 
(R. 2275) . 
B. S o m e Of The Limited Partners Begin To Stop Paying Their 
Assessments . 
D u r i n g 1979 and early 1 9 8 0 , many of the l i m i t e d 
partners refused to pay a s s e s s m e n t s m a d e by t h e i r g e n e r a l 
p a r t n e r ( R i c h t r o n , I n c . or R i c h t r o n G e n e r a l ) . (R. 2 1 0 1 ) . 
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A c c o r d i n g l y , R i c h t r o n , Inc. and Richtron General, although 
under no obligation to do so, made substantial loan advances 
to the L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p s for the purpose of satisfying 
d e l i n q u e n t and c u r r e n t land c o n t r a c t i n s t a l l m e n t o b l i g a -
t i o n s , i r r i g a t i o n e q u i p m e n t o b l i g a t i o n s , well d r i l l i n g 
expenses and other operating e x p e n s e s . (R. 2 1 0 0 ) . By J u n e , 
1 9 8 0 , t h e a g g r e g a t e a m o u n t of those a d v a n c e s , all of which 
were required by the p a r t n e r s h i p a g r e e m e n t s to be r e p a i d , 
exceeded $ 3 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 . Jkk 
C. R i c h i n s ' Good F a i t h And Low P r o f i l e Efforts To Elicit 
The Cooperation Of The Non-Paying Limited P a r t n e r s . 
U n d e r the L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p a g r e e m e n t s , the 
general partner, R i c h t r o n , I n c . or R i c h t r o n G e n e r a l , had 
the power to terminate the interests of any limited partners 
w h o f a i l e d to pay t h e i r pro rata p o r t i o n of the L i m i t e d 
P a r t n e r s h i p s ' o p e r a t i n g e x p e n s e s . (R. 2 1 0 1 ) . As the 
district court found: 
It a p p e a r s R i c h i n s was reluctant to stir 
up trouble with such defaulting investors, 
h o p i n g t i m e w o u l d t a k e c a r e of the 
problem, and that the advances made by the 
g e n e r a l p a r t n e r s , t h o u g h unknown to have 
been m a d e by the l i m i t e d p a r t n e r s until 
the b u b b l e s b e g a n b u r s t i n g about M a y , 
1 9 8 0 , w o u l d t a k e c a r e of the d e b t s and 
expenses until better times evolved. 
(R. 2102) 
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D . S a m p s o n B e g i n s I n t e r f e r i n g With The R i c h i n s P a r t i e s ' 
Management And Control Of The Limited P a r t n e r s h i p s . 
On May 2 9 , 1980, Richins conducted a meeting of the 
Catlow Valley Farms Limited Partnership at which many of the 
l i m i t e d p a r t n e r s w e r e in a t t e n d a n c e . (R. 2103, 2 1 0 7 - 0 8 ) . 
Sampson, who was retained by two of the limited p a r t n e r s to 
e v a l u a t e t h e i r interests in that partnership, also attended 
the m e e t i n g . (R. 2 0 7 6 - 7 7 ) . After Richins informed those in 
a t t e n d a n c e that two j u d g m e n t s ( i n c l u d i n g the Osborn Judg-
ment) had recently been entered against the Richins Parties, 
Sampson began sowing the seeds of investor discontent: 
His [Sampson's] a c t i o n s t h e r e w e r e a bit 
m o r e than j u s t p r i v a t e l y c o u n s e l i n g his 
two clients, for he not only r e c o m m e n d e d 
to t h o s e at the m e e t i n g and got started 
the m o v e m e n t to h a v e R i c h t r o n F i n a n c i a l 
file for b a n k r u p t c y u n d e r c h a p t e r 11 
p r o c e e d i n g s , but he also e x p r e s s e d the 
legal o p i n i o n to all present that he did 
not t h i n k R i c h t r o n F i n a n c i a l could keep 
the m a r k - u p e q u i t y a r i s i n g from Richtron 
Financial's resale of the farm property to 
the C a t l o w V a l l e y P a r t n e r s h i p for an 
amount in excess of what it paid for it, 
which was a theme which Sampson repeatedly 
[and e r r o n e o u s l y ] expressed in the m o n t h s 
and years ahead. 
(R. 2076-77) . 
As set f o r t h b e l o w , S a m p s o n c o n t i n u e d to agitate 
against the interests of the Richins P a r t i e s and g r a d u a l l y 
s e i z e c o n t r o l of the Limited Partnerships through a variety 
of predatory m a n e u v e r s . 
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1. S a m p s o n ' s T e n u r e As Legal Counsel For The Richins 
Parties And His Betrayal Of Their Trust. 
At a L i m i t e d Partnership meeting on June 26, 1980, 
S a m p s o n and two of his c l i e n t s agreed to p u r c h a s e the 
capital stock of the Richtron Companies for $ 7 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 . (R. 
2 0 7 8 ) . At that t i m e , R i c h i n s i n f o r m e d S a m p s o n that he 
a n t i c i p a t e d that several creditors would be filing lawsuits 
a g a i n s t the R i c h t r o n C o m p a n i e s in the n e a r f u t u r e . (R. 
2 0 7 8 - 7 9 ) . S a m p s o n i n s t r u c t e d Richins to send him any such 
complaints and told R i c h i n s that he " . . . w o u l d a n s w e r and 
stall them o f f . " _I_d. P u r s u a n t to that u n d e r s t a n d i n g , 
S a m p s o n " . . . s o o n b e c a m e involved in handling certain legal 
m a t t e r s for R i c h i n s and his c o m p a n i e s . " (R. 2 0 7 9 ) . 
S p e c i f i c a l l y , S a m p s o n a g r e e d to r e p r e s e n t the R i c h i n s 
Parties and p r o t e c t t h e i r i n t e r e s t s in at least f o u r t e e n 
s e p a r a t e m a t t e r s . (R. 2 0 7 9 - 8 3 ) . After agreeing to answer 
and otherwise take care of those litigation matters, Sampson 
f a i l e d to do so, t h e r e b y a l l o w i n g at least five cases to 
result in the entry of default judgments against the Richins 
Parties. (R. 2 0 8 1 ) . 
During this same time period -- August, 1980 -- the 
Richins Parties' prior legal c o u n s e l , D a v i d G i l l e t t e , sent 
S a m p s o n a check in the a m o u n t of $ 1 0 , 7 1 3 . 0 0 p a y a b l e to 
Sampson for the account of one of the Limited P a r t n e r s h i p s . 
(R. 2 0 8 2 ) . In the t r a n s m i t t a l l e t t e r a c c o m p a n y i n g that 
check, Mr. Gillette informed Richins that the f u n d s w e r e to 
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be used e x c l u s i v e l y for the Catlow Valley Limited Partner-
ship and w e r e to be r e l e a s e d to the g e n e r a l p a r t n e r , 
R i c h t r o n , I n c . , a f t e r S a m p s o n and R i c h i n s had f i n a l i z e d 
their arrangements to "work together." JkL However, Sampson 
p r o m p t l y d i s r e g a r d e d t h o s e i n s t r u c t i o n s by e n d o r s i n g and 
t r a n s f e r r i n g the c h e c k to his n e w l y h i r e d farm m a n a g e r , 
Keith B l a n c h . Jjd. 
Notably, one of the matters in which Sampson agreed 
to assist the Richins Parties was negotiating a c o m p r o m i s e d 
s e t t l e m e n t of the Osborn Judgment. In that regard, Sampson 
participated with Richins in seeking to n e g o t i a t e a s e t t l e -
ment of Osborn's claim during a meeting on July 1, 1980. (R. 
2 0 7 9 ) . While the district court found that the "...certain-
ty of t h e e x i s t e n c e of an attorney/client relation between 
Sampson and Richins during discussions w i t h . . . O s b o r n . . . is 
by no m e a n s c l e a r , " R. 2 0 7 9 , the record is undisputed that 
one of the files that M r . G i l l e t t e t u r n e d o v e r to S a m p s o n 
for Sampson's attention in August, 1980 was the Osborn file. 
(R. 2 0 8 3 ; E x h i b i t s 64 and 6 7 ) . T h a t was c o n s i s t e n t with 
R i c h i n s ' understanding. (Exhibit 1 1 8 ) . 
In evaluating the extent to which Sampson's conduct 
d e v i a t e d from the standard of care customarily imposed upon 
lawyers in the representation of their clients, the district 
court concluded that: 
Sampson's acceptance of the representation 
of defendants in v a r i o u s l a w s u i t s as set 
f o r t h in the f i n d i n g s and his failure to 
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a n s w e r or o t h e r w i s e r e s p o n d , or to take 
steps for d e f e n d a n t s to o b t a i n o t h e r 
counsel and t h e r e b y avoid d e f a u l t s , 
c o n s t i t u t e d n e g l i g e n c e and a f a i l u r e to 
m e a s u r e up to the s t a n d a r d of care to be 
expected of m e m b e r s of the legal p r o f e s -
sion. 
(R. 2 2 0 9 ) . 
2. S a m p s o n ' s S o l i c i t a t i o n , R e c e i p t And W r o n g f u l 
R e t e n t i o n Of C a p i t a l C o n t r i b u t i o n s And Crop 
Proceeds . 
B e g i n n i n g in late J u n e , 1980, some of the limited 
partners insisted, and Richins consented, that Sampson serve 
as the r e p o s i t o r y of c a p i t a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s . (R. 2 1 1 2 ) . 
That m e c h a n i s m was put in p l a c e to i n s u r e some d e g r e e of 
c o n t r o l o v e r how the f u n d s w e r e s p e n t . J_d. (R. 2 1 5 0 ) . 
I m p o r t a n t l y , S a m p s o n was in all instances to "...pass the 
funds t h r o u g h to R i c h i n s for p a y m e n t on p r e s s i n g o b l i g a -
t i o n s " of the Limited Partnerships. (R. 2 1 1 2 ) . In classic 
understatement, the district court sardonically observed: 
That plan was not f o l l o w e d to the letter 
and S a m p s o n b e g a n p l a c i n g and r e t a i n i n g 
p a r t n e r c o n t r i b u t i o n s in his trust 
accounts at his bank, and p a r t i c u l a r l y so 
when the settlement agreement [between the 
Richins Parties and the limited p a r t n e r s ] 
was not approved. 
(R. 2 1 5 0 ) . I n d e e d , the e x t e n t to w h i c h S a m p s o n deviated 
from the "letter" of the agreement is staggering: from June 
2 7 , 1 9 8 0 to O c t o b e r 2 9 , 1 9 8 4 , he s o l i c i t e d and r e c e i v e d 
a p p r o x i m a t e l y $ 1 , 5 2 2 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 of c a p i t a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s and 
p r o c e e d s d e r i v e d from the sale of crops cultivated on the 
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L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p s ' p r o p e r t i e s , (R. 2 2 6 5 ) . R i c h i n s 
r e p e a t e d l y m a d e d e m a n d on S a m p s o n to comply with the 
o r i g i n a l a g r e e m e n t by r e l i n q u i s h i n g the p r o c e e d s to the 
R i c h t r o n C o m p a n i e s that w e r e then (and, as the d i s t r i c t 
court c o n c l u d e d , a l w a y s ) the sole general p a r t n e r of the 
L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p s . (R. 2 0 5 6 , 2 2 2 6 ; E x h i b i t s 54, 147, 
161, 162, 163, 179, 182, 184, 188, 195, 196, 198, 2 0 4 , 2 0 6 , 
2 0 9 ) . 
3. S a m p s o n ' s R e p e a t e d E f f o r t s To Stop The R i c h i n s 
Parties From Being Repaid Loan Advances. 
In early J u n e , 1 9 8 0 , S a m p s o n i n f o r m e d n u m e r o u s 
limited partners that the Richins Parties were not e n t i t l e d 
to the r e p a y m e n t of any loan a d v a n c e s they had previously 
made to the Limited Partnerships. (R. 2 1 0 0 - 0 1 , 2 1 4 8 ) . He 
" r e p e a t e d l y " r e i t e r a t e d that statement "both orally and in 
letters." (R. 2 1 4 8 ) . The amount of those advances exceeded 
$ 3 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 . (R. 2 1 0 0 ) . As a result of Sampson's state-
m e n t s , the limited p a r t n e r s refused to c o n s e n t to the 
L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p s ' repayment of the loan advances to the 
Richins Parties (R. 2 1 1 0 - 2 1 1 2 ) . 
A n o t h e r i m p o r t a n t result of S a m p s o n ' s statements 
regarding repayment of advances was to prevent c o n s u m m a t i o n 
of an early settlement of the Limited Partnerships' affairs. 
(R. 2 1 1 2 - 1 3 ) . In the words of the district court: 
A m a j o r s t u m b l i n g block [to s e t t l e m e n t ] 
was the insistence of a few p a r t n e r s that 
n o t h i n g should be paid to R i c h i n s which 
factor, I believe, and so find, was based 
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in part upon Sampson's early and repeated 
statements that the p a r t n e r s h i p s w e r e not 
obligated to repay a d v a n c e s . Id. 
4. S a m p s o n F l o o d s T h e L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s With Letters 
C r i t i c i z i n g T h e R i c h i n s P a r t i e s And U r g i n g The 
L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s To I n s e r t His C o r p o r a t i o n s As 
General P a r t n e r . 
By e a r l y D e c e m b e r , 1 9 8 0 , the long h o p e d - f o r 
s e t t l e m e n t b e t w e e n t h e R i c h i n s P a r t i e s and the l i m i t e d 
p a r t n e r s had f a l l e n t h r o u g h . (R. 2 1 1 2 ) . At that point, 
Sampson prepared and sent to all of the limited p a r t n e r s of 
the L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p s a l e t t e r dated December 2, 1 9 8 0 . 
(R. 2 1 1 9 - 2 0 ; Exhibit 7 ) . That letter sets forth in a s t o n -
i s h i n g d e t a i l and w i t h a l m o s t p a l p a b l e rage, a plan that 
Sampson and several of the limited p a r t n e r s had c o n c e i v e d 
to w r e s t c o n t r o l of the L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p s f r o m the 
Richtron C o m p a n i e s . In that l e t t e r , S a m p s o n m a d e a n u m b e r 
of i n f l a m m a t o r y and u l t i m a t e l y destructive recommendations 
to a 1 1 of the l i m i t e d p a r t n e r s . 5 Among those recommenda-
t i o n s w a s that the i n v e s t o r s r e f u s e to s e t t l e w i t h t h e 
Richins Parties; that the i n v e s t o r s not pay any m o n i e s to 
t h e R i c h i n s Parties; that the investors stop payment on any 
checks previously issued to the R i c h i n s P a r t i e s ; t h a t the 
i n v e s t o r s sue the R i c h i n s P a r t i e s for fraud and breach of 
It is i m p o r t a n t to recall that Sampson represented only 
2 of the 130 investors in the Limited P a r t n e r s h i p s . As 
the district court concluded with apparent e x a s p e r a t i o n , 
Sampson "never fully specifically identified" any of the 
additional clients whom he purportedly represented. 
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f i d u c i a r y d u t y ; that the investors send all further monies 
to Sampson, and not the Ri chins Parties; that the i n v e s t o r s 
consent to Sampson inserting his professional corporation as 
successor general partner of the Limited P a r t n e r s h i p s ; that 
the i n v e s t o r s give t h e i r v o t i n g p r o x i e s to S a m p s o n ; and, 
that the investors pay substantial compensation to S a m p s o n . 
Id. 
D u r i n g the next three y e a r s , Sampson sent numerous 
letters to the investors in which he denigrated the Ri c h i n s 
P a r t i e s and sought to obtain investor support for his plan 
to seize control of the Limited P a r t n e r s h i p s . In so d o i n g , 
S a m p s o n "...had for all practical purposes reduced Richins' 
control in partnership a f f a i r s to a l e t t e r w r i t i n g r o l e . " 
(R. 2 1 6 1 ) . 
5. Sampson's Acquisition Of The Osborn Judgment. 
I m m e d i a t e l y a f t e r s e n d i n g the D e c e m b e r 2, 1980 
letter, Sampson contacted Osborn and Osborn's legal c o u n s e l 
for the p u r p o s e of b u y i n g the Osborn Judgment. (R. 2 0 5 0 ) . 
T h o s e d i s c u s s i o n s r e s u l t e d in a J a n u a r y , 1981 a g r e e m e n t 
whereby Osborn agreed to sell the Osborn Judgment to Sampson 
for $ 4 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 , $20,000.00 of which was to be paid i m m e d i -
a t e l y and the b a l a n c e of which was to be paid within three 
m o n t h s . ld_. Accordingly, on January 23, 1981, Sampson sent 
a c h e c k in the a m o u n t of $ 2 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 to O s b o r n ' s legal 
c o u n s e l . J_d. S e v e r a l days l a t e r , counsel transmitted to 
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Sampson an assignment of the Osborn Judgment that recited on 
its face that in c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the sum of $ 4 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 , 
O s b o r n a s s i g n e d to S a m p s o n p e r s o n a l l y all of his r i g h t , 
t i t l e and i n t e r e s t in and to the O s b o r n J u d g m e n t . (R. 
2 0 5 0 - 5 2 ) . In a cover letter a c c o m p a n y i n g that a s s i g n m e n t , 
O s b o r n ' s counsel wished Sampson "good luck on your proceed-
ings against the [ R i c h i n s P a r t i e s ] . " ( E x h i b i t 1 7 ) . For 
o b v i o u s r e a s o n s , Sampson did not inform the Richins Parties 
of that acquisition. (R. 2 0 5 1 ) . 
Both the i n i t i a l $ 2 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 (and the a d d i t i o n a l 
$45,000.00 that Sampson later paid to O s b o r n after S a m p s o n 
d e f a u l t e d in his p a y m e n t of the required initial install-
ments) were derived from monies paid to Sampson by investors 
in the Limited P a r t n e r s h i p s . (R. 2 0 5 0 ) . Sampson's admitted 
p u r p o s e for a c q u i r i n g the O s b o r n J u d g m e n t was for the 
p u r p o s e of p r e s e r v i n g and a s s e r t i n g a c l a i m a g a i n s t the 
Richins Parties by b r i n g i n g an a c t i o n t h e r e o n . (R. 2 0 5 9 , 
2 2 0 3 ) . A c c o r d i n g l y , the d i s t r i c t court c o n c l u d e d that 
Sampson's p u r c h a s e of the O s b o r n J u d g m e n t v i o l a t e d Utah 
Code Ann. §78-51-27, which prohibits a lawyer from acquiring 
a " . . . d e m a n d of any kind for the p u r p o s e of b r i n g i n g an 
action thereon..." (R. 2 2 0 2 - 0 3 ) . It further concluded that 
Sampson's dual v i o l a t i o n s of that s t a t u t e w e r e "a s e r i o u s 
violation of law." (R. 2124) . 
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6. S a m p s o n ' s I n a b i l i t y To C o m p l y With The R e q u i r e -
m e n t s Of Utah Law R e g a r d i n g The Substitution Of A 
S u c c e s s o r G e n e r a l P a r t n e r In The Limited Partner-
ships. 
In an e f f o r t to carry out one of the p r i m a r y 
jbjectives articulated in his December 2, 1980 l e t t e r -- to 
;ubstitute his professional corporation as successor general 
>artner of each of the L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p s -- S a m p s o n 
;ought to s o l i c i t from each of the l i m i t e d p a r t n e r s a 
imi ted power of attorney authorizing S a m p s o n to v o t e each 
;uch p a r t n e r ' s i n t e r e s t in the L i m i t e d Partnerships. (R. 
J119 - 2 0 ) . As the d i s t r i c t court c o n c l u d e d , S a m p s o n ' s 
ittempted solicitation of the powers of attorney was one of 
;he first s t e p s in S a m p s o n ' s " . . . s i g n i f i c a n t e f f o r t to 
o b t a i n c o n t r o l of all the p a r t n e r s h i p s and to e x c l u d e 
R i c h i n s t h e r e f r o m . " l_d_. "This activity [the solicitation 
of the l i m i t e d p o w e r s of a t t o r n e y ] marks the beginning of 
Sampson's concerted efforts to interfere in each partnership 
b u s i n e s s and to s e i z e and take c o n t r o l t h e r e o f to the 
exclusion of Richins and his companies." Id. 
Relying upon the limited powers of attorney that he 
a c t u a l l y o b t a i n e d , S a m p s o n p u r p o r t e d to elect his own 
p r o f e s s i o n a l corporation, John P. Sampson, P.C., as succes-
sor general partner of each of the Limited P a r t n e r s h i p s . (R. 
2 1 5 2 - 5 3 ) . However, he was soon informed by the court of the 
self-evident fact that under the Utah Professional C o r p o r a -
tion A c t , p r o f e s s i o n a l corporations were and are precluded 
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from o p e r a t i n g b u s i n e s s e s o t h e r than those for which they 
are s p e c i f i c a l l y f o r m e d . (R. 2 1 5 4 ) . In o t h e r w o r d s , 
Sampson's professional corporation organized for the express 
purpose of practicing law could not be utilized as an entity 
engaged in the management of agricultural e n t e r p r i s e s . Id. 
The d i s t r i c t c o u r t then a d r o i t l y s u m m a r i z e d the 
numerous steps and a t t e m p t e d c o r r e c t i v e m e a s u r e s S a m p s o n 
u n d e r t o o k to insert his other corporation, Ag-Management, 
as successor general p a r t n e r of the L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p s . 
( S e e , R. 2 1 2 0 - 2 1 2 3 ) . The m a n n e r in w h i c h t h o s e m u l t i p l e 
e f f o r t s ran afoul of the r e q u i r e m e n t s of the Utah Uniform 
L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p Act contained in §48-1-1 et. seq., Utah 
Code A n n . (1953) is set forth at R. 2 1 2 1 - 2 3 . 
In November, 1982, Richins sought and obtained in a 
related state court proceeding entitled Bl ackfoot Farms , et. 
a l . v. Paul H. R i c h i n s , et. a!., (Second Judicial District 
C o u r t of D a v i s C o u n t y , Utah, Civil No. 30994) a determina-
tion that S a m p s o n ' s v a r i o u s e f f o r t s to s u b s t i t u t e his 
c o r p o r a t i o n s as s u c c e s s o r g e n e r a l p a r t n e r of the Limited 
Partnerships did not c o m p l y with the Utah U n i f o r m L i m i t e d 
P a r t n e r s h i p A c t . (R. 2 1 2 4 - 2 5 ) . In making that determina-
t i o n , the court e n t e r e d d e t a i l e d f i n d i n g s of fact and 
c o n c l u s i o n s of law that the R i c h t r o n C o m p a n i e s were, and 
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always had been, the sole authorized general partners of the 
Limited P a r t n e r s h i p s . ^ 
7. Sampson's Cooperation With The IRS As An Additional 
Vehicle For Dismembering The Richins P a r t i e s . 
D u r i n g 1 9 8 2 , and while simultaneously pursuing the 
conduct described a b o v e , S a m p s o n also c o m m u n i c a t e d f r e e l y 
w i t h the IRS in s e e k i n g to a s s i s t it in i d e n t i f y i n g and 
describing various assets owned by the R i c h t r o n C o m p a n i e s . 
See n . 2 , supra. 
S h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r , on O c t o b e r 2 9 , 1 9 8 2 , the IRS 
conducted a p u b l i c a u c t i o n for the p u r p o s e of s e e k i n g to 
sell t h e v a r i o u s a s s e t s of the R i c h t r o n C o m p a n i e s . (R. 
2 1 2 5 - 2 6 ) . S a m p s o n , as the only b i d d e r at that s a l e , 
p u r p o r t e d to a c q u i r e the R i c h t r o n A f f i l i a t e s ' a s s e t s . 
id.7 
8. S a m p s o n ' s O n g o i n g S o l i c i t a t i o n And Use Of Monies 
F r o m S o m e Of T h e L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s Of The Limited 
Partnershi ps . 
From J u n e , 1980 to N o v e m b e r , 1982 (just after the 
IRS s a l e at w h i c h S a m p s o n p u r p o r t e d to a c q u i r e w h a t e v e r 
i n t e r e s t the Richtron Companies had in the Limited Partner-
s h i p s ) , S a m p s o n s o l i c i t e d , r e c e i v e d and d i s b u r s e d " . . . a t 
In the p r e s e n t c a s e , J u d g e C r o f t d e c l i n e d to accord 
p r e c l u s i v e e f f e c t to the Blackfoot Farms judgment, but 
n e v e r t h e l e s s , with only one exception, reached the same 
result Judge Palmer did in the Blackfoot Farms case. 
As i n d i c a t e d at n. 3, s u p r a , that s a l e w a s , at the 
i n s t a n c e of the R i c h i n s P a r t i e s , later voided by the 
United States District Court for the District of U t a h . 
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l e a s t $ 6 4 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 f r o m a n d f o r t h e l i m i t e d p a r t n e r s a n d 
t h e i r p a r t n e r s h i p s . " ( R . 2 1 2 3 ) . In d o i n g s o , he d i r e c t e d 
t h e i n v e s t o r s t o s e n d t h e m o n i e s t o " . . . h i m a n d n o t t o 
R i c h i n s . " J_d. 8 F r o m N o v e m b e r , 1 9 8 2 t o O c t o b e r , 1 9 8 4 , 
S a m p s o n r e c e i v e d an a d d i t i o n a l $ 9 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 , r e s u l t i n g in 
t o t a l r e c e i p t s f o r t h e f o u r and o n e - h a l f y e a r p e r i o d of 
a p p r o x i m a t e l y $ 1 , 5 2 2 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 . (R. 2 2 6 5 ) . T h u s , d u r i n g t h a t 
p e r i o d o f t i m e , " . . . S a m p s o n h a d t a k e n o v e r and a s s u m e d 
c o n t r o l of t h e t w e n t y - f i v e p a r t n e r s h i p s , and he w a s r e c e i v -
i n g all o f t h e f u n d s , d i s b u r s i n g t h e m and u s i n g t h e m in 
w h a t e v e r w a y he d e t e r m i n e d . He c o n t i n u e d such c o n t r o l f o r 
f i v e y e a r s , y e t p r o d u c e d no e v i d e n c e as to w h a t had h a p p e n e d 
t o t h o s e p a r t n e r s h i p s . " ( R . 2 1 5 8 ) . H i s u s e of t h o s e 
p a r t n e r s h i p f u n d s w a s d e t e r m i n e d by t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t to be 
" u n a u t h o r i z e d " b e c a u s e t h e R i c h t r o n C o m p a n i e s " . . . r e m a i n e d 
g e n e r a l p a r t n e r w i t h c o m p l e t e c o n t r o l o v e r p a r t n e r s h i p 
a f f a i r s . " ( R . 2 2 3 6 ) . So l o n g as S a m p s o n f a i l e d to l a w f u l l y 
i n s t a l l his c o r p o r a t i o n s as s u c c e s s o r g e n e r a l p a r t n e r of t h e 
L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p s , he h a d " n o l e g a l a u t h o r i t y to m a k e 
s u c h d e c i s i o n s r e g a r d i n g p a r t n e r s h i p a s s e t s . " (R. 2 0 5 6 ) . 
I n d e e d , 
in t h e L• 
e x a m p l e 
S a m p s o n ' s s o l i c i t a t i o n 
imited P a r t n e r s h i p s 
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i n v e s t o r s , S a m p s o n s t a t e d : 
o v e r a ll 
t h o s e pc 
R i c h t r o n 
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N o t a b l y , from the m o m e n t the federal court voided 
the IRS tax sale on May 1 6 , 1984 (R. 2 1 5 7 ) , the legal 
a b i l i t y of S a m p s o n and his l i m i t e d p a r t n e r c l i e n t s to 
undertake any further efforts to wind up the a f f a i r s of any 
of the L i m i t e d Partnerships "...ended then and there." (R. 
2 2 3 1 ) . However, even after the entry of that o r d e r , the two 
bank a c c o u n t s u t i l i z e d by S a m p s o n -- the Ag M a n a g e m e n t 
account and the Consolidated Farms account -- had a b a l a n c e 
of a p p r o x i m a t e l y $ 2 8 9 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 . (R. 2229, 2244, 2263, 2 2 7 6 ) . 
That amount, all of which legally belonged to Richtron, Inc. 
and R i c h t r o n G e n e r a l , is g r e a t e r than the a m o u n t of 
consequential damages awarded to Richtron, Inc. and Richtron 
General . (R. 2278) . 
9. Sampson's Concealment Of His Predatory Conduct. 
S a m p s o n b o a s t e d in a letter sent to all investors 
that he had creatively concealed from the Richins Parties --
his own f o r m e r c l i e n t s -- the financial information neces-
sary to trace his use of the Limited Partnerships' funds: 
I w a n t e d him [ R i c h i n s ] to spend all his 
time occupied at d o i n g s o m e t h i n g , t r y i n g 
to f i g u r e out w h a t we had d o n e . I have 
always known that if he went t h r o u g h the 
p r o p e r p r o c e d u r e s in court he could get 
the information. I simply w a n t e d him to 
spend the t i m e and m o n e y to do it. 
(Exhibit 88) . 
E. General Overview Of C a s e . 
The district court cogently summarized its decision 
as fol 1 ows: 
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The r e c o r d in s u m m a r y thus shows that in 
May, 1980, Rich ins and his c o m p a n i e s had 
c o n t r o l of at l e a s t t w e n t y - f i v e limited 
farm partnerships with assets and liabili-
t i e s of such a n a t u r e that t h e y had 
serious financial p r o b l e m s in M a y , 1 9 8 0 , 
w h e n S a m p s o n f i r s t b e c a m e i n v o l v e d . It 
further shows that when Sampson f i r s t got 
involved he had nothing in the twenty-five 
p a r t n e r s h i p s e x c e p t two c l i e n t s that 
w a n t e d a d v i c e . By S a m p s o n ' s act and 
conduct by the end of 1980 -- within seven 
m o n t h s -- S a m p s o n had t a k e n o v e r and 
a s s u m e d c o n t r o l of the t w e n t y - f i v e 
p a r t n e r s h i p s , that he was receiving all of 
the funds, disbursing them and u s i n g them 
in whatever way he d e t e r m i n e d . 
... 
S a m p s o n s u g g e s t e d from time to time that 
his sole o b j e c t i v e was to s a l v a g e the 
p a r t n e r s h i p a s s e t s for the l i m i t e d 
partners to the point of at l e a s t g e t t i n q 
back their i n v e s t m e n t s . The evidence does 
not show that all i n v e s t o r s j o i n e d in 
r e t a i n i n g S a m p s o n as t h e i r a t t o r n e y or 
t h e i r p r o x y , but t h e e v i d e n c e d o e s make 
c l e a r that Sampson's main goal and effort 
soon b e c a m e one of getting rid of Rich ins 
from all p a r t n e r s h i p s and o b t a i n i n g 
c o n t r o l t h e r e o f for h i m s e l f and his 
c l i e n t s w h o m he n e v e r fully specifically 
i d e n t i f i e d . I t h i n k the evidence shows, 
and so f i n d , that his s e l f - d e c l a r e d 
b e n e v o l e n t m o t i v e soon changed to one of 
g r e e d and a v e n d e t t a to oust Richins and 
take complete c o n t r o l . 
... 
As floundering as the p a r t n e r s h i p s w e r e , 
Sampson saw value there and spent what now 
totals six years in achieving w h a t he now 
h a s , w h a t e v e r it may b e , leaving Rich ins 
and his companies with no t a n g i b l e a s s e t s 
or values . 
(R. 2 1 5 8 - 5 9 , 2275) (Emphasis a d d e d ) . 
F i n a l l y , as the c o u r t c o n c l u d e d , "it was problems 
c r e a t e d by Rich i n s ' m i s m a n a g e m e n t f o l l o w e d by S a m p s o n ' s 
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tortious conduct that brought this case to court for a 
decision as to whether any damages are recoverable upon the 
counterclaim." (R. 2275). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. Sampson included in the record in this appeal 
only a portion of the trial testimony. His selective 
presentation of only a fragmentary record makes it impossi-
ble for the court to meaningfully review the judgment. 
Absent the missing portions of the record, there is no way 
that Sampson can establish that the district court's 
findings of fact are "clearly erroneous" or that the 
judgment be reversed. 
II. Even ignoring the serious problems created by 
Sampson's failure to include the entire record on appeal, 
Sampson, like any other appellant, has the burden of 
marshalling all of the evidence in support of the trial 
court's findings and to then demonstrate, that even when 
viewed in the light most favorable to those findings, the 
evidence is insufficient to support those findings. Because 
Sampson has only nominally sought to marshall the trial 
court's facts, he has failed to meet the heavy burden of 
establishing the existence of reversible error. 
III. The district court properly identified at 
least twenty-two separate improper means that Sampson used 
to seize control of the Limited Partnerships and extinguish 
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the interest of the Richins Parties. When aggregated, those 
findings e s t a b l i s h i m p r o p e r m e a n s far m o r e e x t e n s i v e and 
s e r i o u s than t h o s e d e e m e d to be actionable in this court's 
s e m i n a l h o l d i n g in L e i g h Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, 
657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1 9 8 2 ) . 
IV. The d i s t r i c t court p r o p e r l y c o n c l u d e d that 
Sampson's takeover of the Limited Partnerships was a c t u a t e d 
by an i m p r o p e r p u r p o s e . In r e a c h i n g that conclusion, the 
d i s t r i c t court r e a s o n a b l y i n f e r r e d the e x i s t e n c e of an 
i m p r o p e r p u r p o s e from the e x t e n s i v e s e r i e s of p r e d a t o r y 
unlawful means utilized by S a m p s o n to t a k e c o n t r o l of the 
Limited P a r t n e r s h i p s . 
V. The d i s t r i c t court p r o p e r l y c o n c l u d e d that 
Sampson's tortious conduct was the proximate cause of injury 
and d a m a g e s to the Richins P a r t i e s . Under the two possible 
tests of proximate cause -- the "substantial factor" test or 
the "but f o r " test -- S a m p s o n ' s unlawful interference was 
the legal c a u s e of i n j u r y and d a m a g e s to the R i c h i n s 
Parti es . 
V I . In a s s e r t i n g that the d i s t r i c t court impro-
perly concluded that the R i c h i n s P a r t i e s did not w a i v e or 
are e s t o p p e d from c o m p l a i n i n g about S a m p s o n ' s c o n d u c t , 
S a m p s o n has f a i l e d to m a r s h a l ! all e v i d e n c e r e l e v a n t to 
t h o s e f i n d i n g s . T h e r e f o r e , a p p e l l a t e review of Sampson's 
contention cannot be u n d e r t a k e n . 
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V I I . The d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s award t o R i c h t r o n , I n c . 
and R i c h t r o n Genera l o f c o n s e q u e n t i a l damages i n t h e amount 
o f $ 2 5 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 and t o R i c h t r o n F i n a n c i a l and R i c h t r o n , I n c . 
o f s p e c i a l damages i n t h e amount o f $ 3 5 , 1 9 7 . 0 0 c a n n o t be 
c h a l l e n g e d i n t h e f a c e o f an i n c o m p l e t e r e c o r d . I f , 
however , t h e c o u r t e l e c t s t o o v e r l o o k t h e p rob lems posed by 
t h e i n c o m p l e t e r e c o r d , i t i s n e v e r t h e l e s s c l e a r t h a t t he 
damage awards are c o n s i s t e n t w i t h a p p l i c a b l e law and have a 
" r a t i o n a l b a s i s " i n t h e r e c o r d . 
ARGUMENT I 
SAMPSON'S SELECTIVE INCLUSION OF ONLY A 
PORTION OF THE TRIAL TESTIMONY MAKES IT 
IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE COURT TO 
MEANINGFULLY REVIEW THE JUDGMENT 
Rule 1 1 ( e ) ( 2 ) , Supreme Court R u l e s , provides that: 
If the appellant intends to urge on appeal 
that a f i n d i n g or conclusion is unsuppor-
ted by or is contrary to the e v i d e n c e , he 
shall i n c l u d e in the record a transcript 
of all evidence r e l e v a n t to such f i n d i n g 
or conclusion. 
T h i s C o u r t has repeatedly held that an appellant's 
failure to ensure the inclusion of the entire t r a n s c r i p t of 
t e s t i m o n y in the r e c o r d is fatal to a p p e l l a t e r e v i e w of 
c h a l l e n g e d action by the lower court. In Smith v. V u i c i c h, 
699 P.2d 763 (Utah 1 9 8 5 ) , t h e co u r t was confronted with a 
s i t u a t i o n i d e n t i c a l to that in th i s p r o c e e d i n g : L i k e 
S a m p s o n , the appellant ordered only a partial transcript of 
the trial consisting e x c l u s i v e l y of her own t e s t i m o n y and 
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that of her own w i t n e s s e s . As the court pointedly observed, 
the appellant had failed to include any of the r e s p o n d e n t ' s 
e v i d e n c e . In a f f i r m i n g the trial c o u r t ' s j u d g m e n t , this 
court held that: 
W h e r e the record before us is incomplete, 
we are unable to review the e v i d e n c e as a 
w h o l e and must therefore presume that the 
v e r d i c t was s u p p o r t e d by a d m i s s i b l e and 
competent e v i d e n c e . 
I d. at 7 6 5 . A c c o r d , S t e v e n s v. S c h w e n d i m a n , 688 P.2d 466 
(Utah 1 9 8 4 ) . 
Similarly, in James Manufacturing C o . v. Wilson, 15 
Utah 2d 2 1 0 , 390 P.2d 127 ( 1 9 6 4 ) , the a p p e l l a n t s o u g h t 
r e v i e w of the trial c o u r t ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n r e g a r d i n g the 
t i m e l i n e s s of a p p e l l a n t ' s notification of allegedly defec-
tive conditions in c e r t a i n e q u i p m e n t . H o w e v e r , a p p e l l a n t 
d e s i g n a t e d only a portion of the trial testimony on a p p e a l . 
In a f f i r m i n g the trial c o u r t ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n , this court 
held in pertinent part that: 
P l a i n t i f f a r g u e s that t h e r e was not 
sufficient evidence to support defendant's 
c o u n t e r c l a i m and that d e f e n d a n t had not 
notified plaintiff of any a l l e g e d d e f e c t s 
in the equipment within a reasonable t i m e . 
However, plaintiff saw fit to include only 
a p o r t i o n of the t e s t i m o n y in the record 
upon this a p p e a l . Under the circumstances 
it is i m p o s s i b l e for this c o u r t to 
p r o p e r l y a s s e s s the e n t i r e e v i d e n c e and 
d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r the trial c o u r t was 
c o r r e c t in d e n y i n g t h e s e m o t i o n s of the 
p l a i n t i f f . It m u s t , t h e r e f o r e , be 
presumed that the ruling was s u p p o r t e d by 
the evidence produced at the t r i a l . 
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I d. at 1 2 9 . Accord, First Federal Savings & Loan Assoc, of 
Salt L a k e City v. S c h a m a n e k , 684 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1 9 8 4 ) ; ]_n_ 
re V o o r h e e s ' E s t a t e , 12 Utah 2d 3 6 1 , 366 P.2d 977 (1 9 6 1 ) ; 
Sandal! v. Sandall, 57 Utah 150, 193 P. 1093 ( 1 9 2 0 ) . 
This c o u r t ' s i n s i s t e n c e that p r e s e n t a t i o n of the 
entire record underlying the trial court's factual determin-
ations is a condition precedent to review of those determin-
a t i o n s is shared by all c o u r t s that have c o n s i d e r e d the 
q u e s t i o n . Bliss v. T r e e c e , 658 P.2d 169, 172 (Ariz. 1983) 
("Where the record is i n c o m p l e t e , a r e v i e w i n g court must 
assume any evidence not a v a i l a b l e on appeal s u p p o r t e d the 
trial c o u r t ' s a c t i o n . " ) ; In the Matter of Dana P. v. State, 
565 P.2d 2 5 3 , 256 ( O k l a . 1 9 8 2 ) ("In the a b s e n c e of a 
complete record (here, the failure to m a k e a record of the 
t e r m i n a t i o n h e a r i n g ) , the f i n d i n g s of fact and law by the 
trial court are p r e s u m e d to be t r u e . " ) ; Lau v. Nelson, 9 2 
Wash. 2d 823, 601 P.2d 527, 530 (1979) ("Here, the appellant 
has brought up only a part of the r e c o r d , which does not 
reveal the e v i d e n c e w h i c h was placed b e f o r e the jury in 
regard to the circumstances of the accident. C o n s e q u e n t l y , 
we must assume that there was evidence upon the question of 
c a u s a t i o n w h i c h the jury was c a p a b l e of u n d e r s t a n d i n g 
w i t h o u t the aid of an expert. We are in no position to say 
that the lower court abused its discretion in excluding this 
o p i n i o n t e s t i m o n y and must hold the assignment of error to 
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be w i t h o u t m e r i t . " ) ; Visco v. Universal Refuse Removal Co., 
11 A r i z . App. 73, 462 P.2d 90, 92 (1969) ("A finding of fact 
c a n n o t be 'clearly e r r o n e o u s 1 if t h e r e is s u b s t a n t i a l 
e v i d e n c e to support it. How can this court test whether or 
not there is substantial evidence to s u p p o r t the j u d g m e n t , 
when part of the e v i d e n c e , i n c l u d i n g file n o . 1 8 0 8 2 5 , is 
missing? The question a n s w e r s i t s e l f - this court c a n n o t 
review the evidence.") 
O b v i o u s l y , an a p p e l l a n t ' s f a i l u r e to include the 
e n t i r e trial record m a k e s it i m p o s s i b l e for a r e v i e w i n g 
court to determine whether, in any given case, the appellant 
was the victim of reversible error. As this court c o g e n t l y 
noted in Sawyers v. Sawyers, 588 P.2d 607, 608 (Utah 1 9 7 6 ) : 
Appellate review of factual matters can be 
meaningful, orderly and i n t e l l i g e n t only 
in j u x t a p o s i t i o n to a record by which 
l o w e r c o u r t ' s r u l i n g s and d e c i s i o n s on 
disputes can be measured. 
In the case at bar, Sampson has accurately identi-
fied the primary issue in this case as whether the d i s t r i c t 
c o u r t ' s award of d a m a g e s was p r e m i s e d on " s u b s t a n t i a l 
e v i d e n c e of facts and not by m e r e c o n c l u s i o n s nor by 
c o n j e c t u r e . " ( D o c k e t i n g S t a t e m e n t , p . 3 ) . H o w e v e r , to 
o b t a i n a p p e l l a t e r e v i e w of that i s s u e (as well as the 
c o r r e c t n e s s of a variety of "ultimate" facts regarding both 
l i a b i l i t y and d a m a g e s ) , S a m p s o n o f f e r s this court only 
s e l e c t i v e f r a g m e n t s of the t e s t i m o n i a l and d o c u m e n t a r y 
-28-
e v i d e n c e a d d u c e d at t r i a l . S p e c i f i c a l l y , he offers only 
that evidence that he b e l i e v e s s u p p o r t s his view that (i) 
t h e r e is an insufficient factual basis for damages and (ii) 
t h e r e is l i t t l e or no l o g i c a l c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n the 
district court's "probative" facts (which Sampson accepts as 
t r u e ) and the d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s " u l t i m a t e " facts (which 
Sampson seeks to c h a l l e n g e ) . (Brief, pp. 6, 25) He totally 
i g n o r e s the e v i d e n c e e s t a b l i s h e d by n i n e of the R i c h i n s 
P a r t i e s ' w i t n e s s e s and s e e k s , in e f f e c t , to s a n i t i z e the 
e v i d e n c e of r e s p o n d e n t s ' main w i t n e s s , Paul Rich i n s , by 
o r d e r i n g that t e s t i m o n y only to the extent it was elicited 
from S a m p s o n ' s own c o u n s e l . In d o i n g so, S a m p s o n has 
e x c i s e d from the r e c o r d extensive testimony crucial to the 
Richins Parties' case. His studiously selective ordering of 
the r e c o r d p r o m p t e d his own counsel to acknowledge to this 
c o u r t that the e x i s t i n g record on appeal was " t o t a l l y 
i n a d e q u a t e " to c h a l l e n g e the j u d g m e n t . 9 The R i c h i n s 
Parties agree. 
A p p a r e n t l y r e c o g n i z i n g the o b v i o u s j e o p a r d y to 
which his appeal is s u b j e c t e d , S a m p s o n now a r g u e s in his 
b r i e f that with "only few exceptions," he does not contest 
the "probative findings" of the district court and therefore 
That admission was made at the September 7, 1987 hearing 
on the R i c h i n s P a r t i e s ' r e n e w e d m o t i o n to d i s m i s s 
Sampson ' s appeal . 
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has not relied upon the u n d e r l y i n g record..." (Brief, p. 
2 5 ) . He proposes to "focus" upon and c h a l l e n g e the " u l t i -
m a t e f a c t s " d e t e r m i n e d by the d i s t r i c t court based upon 
" t h e s e p r o b a t i v e f a c t s . " Jhd . at p p . 6 and 2 5. A n d , he 
f r a n k l y a c k n o w l e d g e s that his c h a l l e n g e to the d i s t r i c t 
c o u r t ' s award of d a m a g e s is p r e m i s e d on both a lack of 
"evidentiary support" and "sufficient findings." J_d. at p. 
5. H o w e v e r , as s h o w n b e l o w , S a m p s o n ' s effort to save his 
appeal by asking this court to accept as correct "essential-
ly a l l " of the " p r o b a t i v e " or subordinate facts and reject 
the " u l t i m a t e " f a c t s i s , in the face of an i incomplete 
factual record, unavailing. 
U n d e r R u l e 5 2 , Utah R. Civ. P., the district court 
is, of course, required to "...find the facts s p e c i a l l y and 
s t a t e s e p a r a t e l y its c o n c l u s i o n s of law t h e r e o n . . . " As a 
general rule, "findings s h o u l d be l i m i t e d to the u l t i m a t e 
facts and if they ascertain ultimate facts, and sufficiently 
c o n f o r m to the p l e a d i n g s and e v i d e n c e to s u p p o r t the 
judgment, they will be regarded as sufficient, though not as 
full and c o m p l e t e as may be desired." Pearson v. Pearson, 
561 P.2d 1080, 1082 (Utah 1 9 7 7 ) . However, 
R a t i o n a l d e c i s i o n m a k i n g by the trial 
court r e q u i r e s that the court address and 
r e s o l v e all p e r t i n e n t s u b o r d i n a t e and 
u l t i m a t e f a c t u a l i s s u e s w h i c h must be 
r e s o l v e d on the basis of the e v i d e n c e 
p res ented and a p p l i c a b l e rules of l a w . 
This process is even more important to the 
proper functioning of a r e v i e w i n g c o u r t . 
A p p e l l a t e c o u r t s are s i m p l y not in a 
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position to evaluate and resolve conflict-
ing oral t e s t i m o n y as a c c u r a t e l y as a 
trial court. (Emphasis a d d e d ) . 
R o m r e l l v. Z i o n s F i r s t N a t i o n a l B a n k , N.A., 611 P.2d 3 9 2 , 
395 (Utah 1 9 8 0 ) . 
T h e r e f o r e , to the e x t e n t the d i s t r i c t court 
addresses and resolves both subordinate and ultimate factual 
i s s u e s , a p p e l l a t e r e v i e w of their correctness can be based 
only upon resort to the " e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d . " W h e r e , 
h o w e v e r , as in t h i s c a s e , only a s e l e c t i v e portion of the 
trial evidence is made a part of the record on appeal, there 
is no p r i n c i p l e d b a s i s on w h i c h this C o u r t can accept or 
r e j e c t the h u n d r e d s of f a c t u a l f i n d i n g s of the d i s t r i c t 
c o u r t . In o t h e r w o r d s , the absence of the complete record 
renders i m p o s s i b l e any m e a n i n g f u l r e v i e w of the d i s t r i c t 
c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s , r e g a r d l e s s of whether those findings are 
characterized as "subsidiary" or "ultimate." 
T h e r e is s i m p l y no way S a m p s o n can come remotely 
c l o s e to d i s c h a r g i n g his b u r d e n s of (i) i n c l u d i n g a 
"...transcript of all evidence relevant to such finding...," 
as r e q u i r e d by R u l e 1 1 ( e ) ( 2 ) , S u p r e m e C o u r t R u l e s , (i i) 
m a r s h a l l i n g a s u f f i c i e n t l y c o m p l e t e record to enable this 
C o u r t to say with c o n f i d e n c e that some or all of the 
f i n d i n g s are "clearly erroneous" within the meaning of Rule 
5 2 ( a ) , Utah R. Civ. P. or (iii) a s s e m b l i n g and m a r s h a l l i n g 
the e v i d e n c e " s u p p o r t i n g his v e r s i o n of the f a c t s " as 
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required by this court in Scharf v. B.M.G. Corporation, 700 
P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985) . 
As such, the court should decline to review 
Sampson's contentions and affirm the judgment. 
ARGUMENT II 
UNDER THE STANDARDS OF REVIEW APPLICABLE 
TO THIS APPEAL, THE DISTRICT COURT'S 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW CANNOT BE 
ASSAILED AND THE JUDGMENT CANNOT BE REVERSED 
Fewer principles could be better settled than the 
proposition that on appellate review the findings of fact 
and judgment of the trial court are presumed to be valid and 
correct and the heavy burden of establishing error rests 
with the appellant. Hal Taylor Associates v. Union America, 
Inc., 657 P.2d 743, 747 (Utah 1982); Hutcheson v. Gleave, 
632 P.2d 815, (Utah 1981). And, upon review, "this court 
views the evidence and all the inferences that can reason-
ably be drawn therefrom in a light most supportive of the 
trial court's findings." Horton v. Horton, 695 P.2d 102, 106 
(Utah 1984). 
Unless clearly erroneous, findings of fact will not 
be set aside, and, if there is a reasonable basis in 
evidence, a trial court's award of damages will be affirmed 
on appeal. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); Katzenberger v. State, 
735 P.2d 405 (Utah App. 1987). Findings will not be 
disturbed unless they are clearly against the weight of the 
evidence or unless it manifestly appears that the court 
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m i s a p p l i e d t h e law t o e s t a b l i s h e d f a c t s . Brown v . Board of 
E d u c a t i o n o f Morgan Coun ty School D i s t r i c t , 560 P.2d 1129 , 
(Utah 1 9 7 7 ) . 
The heavy burden imposed upon an appellant has been 
cogently expressed by this court as follows: 
It is i n c u m b e n t upon the a p p e l l a n t to 
marshall all of the evidence in support of 
the trial c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s and to then 
demonstrate even when viewed in the light 
most f a v o r a b l e to the factual determina-
tions m a d e by the trial c o u r t , that the 
e v i d e n c e is i n s u f f i c i e n t to s u p p o r t its 
finding s . 
Harline v. Campbell, 728 P.2d 980, 982 (Utah 1 9 8 6 ) . 
In this c a s e , and even c h a r i t a b l y i g n o r i n g the 
p r o b l e m s c r e a t e d by the i n c o m p l e t e r e c o r d , S a m p s o n has 
fa i l e d to m a r s h a l l m o r e than a f r a c t i o n of the e v i d e n c e 
u n d e r l y i n g the d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s , r e g a r d l e s s of 
w h e t h e r t h o s e f i n d i n g s are d e e m e d to be " p r o b a t i v e " or 
" u l t i m a t e . " In his b r i e f , he n o w h e r e r e c i t e s that his 
f r e q u e n t statements that the Richins Parties' loan advances 
were not required to be repaid rendered impossible an earl y 
s e t t l e m e n t of the L i m i t e d Partnerships' affairs and choked 
off their cash flow (R. 2 1 0 0 - 0 1 , 2 1 1 0 - 1 2 , 2 1 4 8 ) ; that his 
s t a t e m e n t s that the R i c h i n s P a r t i e s had b r e a c h e d various 
fiduciary duties had the same effect (R. 2 0 7 6 - 7 7 ) ; that he 
lent substantial assistance to the IRS as an additional 
m e a n s for acquiring control of the Limited Partnerships See 
n . 2 , s u p r a ; that he threatened to seek sanctions and "other 
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relief" against the Rich ins Parties1 legal counsel if 
counsel continued to challenge the propriety of Sampson's 
conduct (R. 2131-32); that he wrongfully solicited and 
received investor monies and crop proceeds in excess of 
$1,500,000.00 (R. 2150, 2265); and, that he actively sought 
to conceal his acquisition of the Osborn Judgment and the 
methods through which he seized control of the Limited 
Partnerships (R. 2051; Exhibit 88), to name a few. 
Sampson's failure to assemble, marshall and explain 
those vital facts is fatal to his appeal. 
ARGUMENT III 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT 
SAMPSON USED A VARIETY OF IMPROPER MEANS TO 
SEIZE CONTROL OF THE LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS AND 
EXTINGUISH THE INTERESTS OF THE RICHINS PARTIES 
The seminal case in this jurisdiction defining the 
required elements of the tort of intentional interference 
with economic relations is, of course, Leigh Furniture and 
Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982). In adopting 
the Oregon definition of this tort, the court held that in 
order to recover damages, the plaintiff must: 
...prove (1) that the defendant intention-
ally interfered with the plaintiff's 
existing or potential economic relations, 
(2) for an improper purpose or by improper 
means, (3) causing injury to the plain-
tiff. 
Id. at 304. 
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In affirming the trial court's entry of judgment on 
a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff in Leigh Furniture, 
this c o u r t c a t a l o g e d the v a r i o u s acts of the d e f e n d a n t 
deemed to constitute improper means of i n t e r f e r e n c e . T h o s e 
i m p r o p e r m e a n s i n c l u d e d (i) f r e q u e n t visits to the plain-
tiff's store during business hours to confront, question and 
a c c u s e the o w n e r of d e f i c i e n c i e s in the o p e r a t i o n of the 
b u s i n e s s (ii) the p r e p a r a t i o n and s e n d i n g of n u m e r o u s 
l e t t e r s c o m p l a i n i n g of the manner in which the store owner 
was performing his contract of p u r c h a s e w i t h the d e f e n d a n t 
( i i i ) the u n i l a t e r a l imposition of conditions not required 
by the purchase contract (iv) cajoling the owner to employ a 
b u s i n e s s consultant with whom the defendant was acquainted, 
but whom the owner was not inclined to hire (v) the f i l i n g 
of two a p p a r e n t l y g r o u n d l e s s lawsuits, and (vi) the filing 
of a c o m p l a i n t , w i t h o u t p r i o r n o t i c e , to t e r m i n a t e the 
p u r c h a s e c o n t r a c t and repossess the owner's business. Id. 
at 2 9 7 - 3 0 1 , 3 0 6 . In f o c u s i n g on the cumulative effect of 
those improper means, the court compellingly observed that: 
T a k e n in i s o l a t i o n , each of the foregoing 
interferences with I s o m ' s b u s i n e s s m i g h t 
be j u s t i f i e d as an overly zealous attempt 
to p r o t e c t t h e c o r p o r a t i o n ' s i n t e r e s t 
under its contract of sale. As such, none 
would establish the intentional i n t e r f e r -
e n c e e l e m e n t of this t o r t , t h o u g h s o m e 
might give rise to a c a u s e of a c t i o n for 
b r e a c h of s p e c i f i c p r o v i s i o n s in the 
c o n t r a c t or the duty of good faith 
p e r f o r m a n c e w h i c h i n h e r e s in e v e r y 
c o n t r a c t u a l r e l a t i o n . Even in small 
g r o u p s , t h e s e acts m i g h t be explained as 
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m e r e l y i n s t a n c e s of a g g r e s s i v e or 
abrasive -- though not illegal or tortious 
t a c t i c s * e x c e s s e s that o c c u r in 
contractual and commercial r e l a t i o n s h i p s . 
But in total and in cumulative effect, as 
a course of action extending over a period 
of t h r e e and one-half years and culminat-
ing in the failure of Isom's business, the 
L e i g h C o r p o r a t i o n ' s acts c r o s s e d the 
t h r e s h o l d b e y o n d w h a t is i n c i d e n t a l and 
justifiable to what is t o r t i o u s . 
]_d. at 306. 
The parallels between the improper means identified 
i n L e i g h F u r n i t u r e and t h o s e i d e n t i f i e d by the d i s t r i c t 
court in this case are striking. The improper means in this 
c a s e i n c l u d e d (i) S a m p s o n ' s b r e a c h of his a g r e e m e n t to 
r e p r e s e n t the i n t e r e s t s of the R i c h ins Parties in pending 
l i t i g a t i o n , thereby allowing n u m e r o u s d e f a u l t j u d g m e n t s to 
be entered against the Richins P a r t i e s , supra p p . 1 0 - 1 2 ; (ii) 
S a m p s o n ' s b r e a c h of his a g r e e m e n t to s e r v e s o l e l y as an 
initial r e p o s i t o r y for the d e p o s i t of i n v e s t o r f u n d s and 
i n s u r e that all such f u n d s w e r e d u l y t r a n s m i t t e d to the 
R i c h t r o n C o m p a n i e s , t h e r e b y c o m p l e t e l y c h o k i n g o f f the 
e n t i r e cash f l o w of t h e L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p s supra p p . 1 2 , 
1 3 ; ( i i i ) S a m p s o n ' s f i r s t effort to p u r c h a s e , with Limited 
P a r t n e r s h i p f u n d s , t h e O s b o r n J u d g m e n t for the a d m i t t e d 
p u r p o s e of s u i n g on it to the p r o f o u n d d e t r i m e n t of his 
former clients and in violation of Utah Code A n n . § 7 8 - 5 1 - 2 7 
s u p r a p p . 1 5 , 1 6 ; (iv) S a m p s o n ' s s e c o n d effort to purchase 
the O s b o r n J u d g m e n t from the s a m e source and for the same 
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p u r p o s e J_d . ; (v) S a m p s o n ' s c o n c e a l m e n t from the Rich ins 
P a r t i e s of his i n t e n t to a c q u i r e the Osborn Judgment Id. ; 
(vi) S a m p s o n ' s f a i l u r e to provide the Richins Parties with 
any a d v a n c e n o t i c e of his i n t e n t to e n f o r c e the O s b o r n 
J u d g m e n t by s u i n g his former clients on it in the State of 
f 
Utah Jjj.; (viii) Sampson's preparation and sending of dozens 
of l e t t e r s to the l i m i t e d partners of the Limited Partner-
s h i p s in w h i c h he r e p e a t e d l y c r i t i c i z e d , d e n i g r a t e d and 
s o u g h t to h u m i l i a t e the R i c h i n s P a r t i e s supra p p . 1 4 , 15; 
(ix) S a m p s o n ' s numerous oral statements to limited partners 
of the L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p s to the s a m e e f f e c t Jji.• ! (x) 
S a m p s o n ' s f r e q u e n t and p a t e n t l y e r r o n e o u s statements that 
the m a r k u p , i . e . the f a v o r a b l e w r i t e u p in the t e r m s and 
c o n d i t i o n s on w h i c h the R i c h t r o n C o m p a n i e s sold the farm 
p r o p e r t i e s to the L i m i t e d Partnerships vi s a_ vis the terms 
and c o n d i t i o n s on which the Richtron Companies obtained the 
farm properties from the original owners, was a breach of an 
u n s p e c i f i e d f i d u c i a r y duty s u p r a p . 9 ; (xi) S a m p s o n ' s 
r e p e a t e d and patently erroneous statements that the massive 
loan advances made by the Richins Parties for the benefit of 
the L i m i t e d Partnerships would not have to be repaid by the 
L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p s s u p r a p p . 1 3 , 1 4 ; ( x i i ) S a m p s o n ' s 
f a i l u r e and r e f u s a l to d e l i v e r to the R i c h i n s P a r t i e s 
c e r t a i n f o r e c l o s u r e d o c u m e n t s that he was duty b o u n d to 
r e t u r n (R. 2 1 5 0 - 5 1 ) ; ( x i i i ) Sampson's legally improper use 
-3 7 -
of l i m i t e d v o t i n g p o w e r s of a t t o r n e y to s u b s t i t u t e his 
various c o r p o r a t i o n s as s u c c e s s o r g e n e r a l p a r t n e r of the 
L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p s supra p p . 1 7 - 1 9 ; (xiv) S a m p s o n ' s 
i l l - f a t e d e f f o r t to d e s i g n a t e a p r o f e s s i o n a l c o r p o r a t i o n 
organized for the purpose of p r a c t i c i n g law as the m a n a g e r 
of a g r i c u l t u r a l properties in violation of the Utah Profes-
sional C o r p o r a t i o n s Act J_d^ • ; (xv) S a m p s o n ' s c o n s i s t e n t 
i n a b i l i t y or unwillingness to amend the certificates of the 
Limited Partnerships to .reflect his s u p p o s e d a d m i t t a n c e as 
s u c c e s s o r g e n e r a l p a r t n e r as r e q u i r e d by the Utah Uniform 
L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p Act ]_d . ; ( x v i ) Sampson's unauthorized 
d i s c l o s u r e to third p a r t i e s of c o n f i d e n t i a l i n f o r m a t i o n 
o b t a i n e d d u r i n g the c o u r s e of his r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of the 
R i c h i n s P a r t i e s (R. 2 1 6 0 ) ; ( x v i i ) S a m p s o n ' s p r e d a t o r y 
r e l i a n c e on the IRS's a t t e m p t to sell the a s s e t s of the 
R i c h t r o n C o m p a n i e s at p u b l i c a u c t i o n ; ( x v i i i ) S a m p s o n ' s 
" b i z a r r e " and " u n p r o f e s s i o n a l " t h r e a t s to the R i c h i n s 
P a r t i e s ' legal c o u n s e l that u n l e s s c o u n s e l i m m e d i a t e y 
r e f r a i n e d from f u r t h e r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of the R i c h i n s 
P a r t i e s , S a m p s o n w o u l d seek "sanctions" and "other relief" 
a g a i n s t c o u n s e l s u p r a p . 4 ; ( x i x ) S a m p s o n ' s f i l i n g of a 
patently meritless lawsuit seeking to have himself appointed 
as receiver for the Limited P a r t n e r s h i p s , w h i c h a c t i o n was 
d i s m i s s e d by r e a s o n of Sampson's failure to substitute his 
c o r p o r a t i o n s as s u c c e s s o r g e n e r a l p a r t n e r of the L i m i t e d 
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P a r t n e r s h i p s in the m a n n e r r e q u i r e d by the Utah U n i f o r m 
L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p Act (R . 2 1 2 4 - 2 5 ) ; (xx) S a m p s o n ' s 
p i r a t i n g away of the R i c h t r o n C o m p a n i e s ' e m p l o y e e s (R. 
2 1 4 1 ) ; ( x x i ) S a m p s o n ' s g l o a t i n g s t a t e m e n t to the l i m i t e d 
p a r t n e r s of the L i m i t e d Partnerships that he had purposely 
stonewalled the Richins Parties in t h e i r e f f o r t s to o b t a i n 
an a c c o u n t i n g of the m a n n e r in w h i c h he had received and 
d i s b u r s e d L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p funds supra p.21; and (xxii) 
S a m p s o n ' s c o n t i n u e d r e c e i p t and d i s b u r s e m e n t of L i m i t e d 
P a r t n e r s h i p f u n d s e v e n a f t e r the f e d e r a l d i s t r i c t c o u r t 
v o i d e d the tax s a l e from which Sampson traced his claim of 
title to the Richtron Companies' assets Id. 
In the f a c e of those findings, Sampson's assertion 
that the m e a n s he used to t a k e c o n t r o l of the L i m i t e d 
P a r t n e r s h i p s were not "predatory" and involved only "errors 
in judgment or technical legal v i o l a t i o n s " ( B r i e f , p . 3 6 ) , 
is i n t e r e s t i n g indeed. It is simply impossible to conceive 
of a pattern of conduct, extending as it does over a p e r i o d 
of m o r e than four y e a r s , that constitutes a more disturbing 
blend of f r a u d u l e n t , d e c e p t i v e and o t h e r w i s e i l l e g a l 
conduct. 10 
C o n t r a r y to S a m p s o n ' s s u g g e s t i o n that the d i s t r i c t 
court f a i l e d to a p p l y a "good f a i t h " s t a n d a r d in 
determining his conduct, there are at least three ready 
a n s w e r s . F i r s t , the c u m u l a t i v e e f f e c t of S a m p s o n ' s 
d e p l o y m e n t of m u l t i p l e means of contract interference 
makes any finding of "good f a i t h " both f a c t u a l l y and 
l e g a l l y i m p o s s i b l e . Second, the district court did in 
fact m a k e s e v e r a l r e f e r e n c e s to S a m p s o n ' s s u p p o s e d 
absence of 
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Therefore, the district court's conclusion that 
Sampson's seizure and control of the Limited Partnerships 
was effectuated through a series of improper means is 
abundantly supported by the meticulous and extensive factual 
findings. As such, there is no basis for invalidating 
either the judgment or the findings on which the judgment is 
based. 
ARGUMENT IV 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT 
SAMPSON'S TAKEOVER OF THE LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS 
WAS ACTUATED BY AN IMPROPER PURPOSE 
A. The Incomplete Record In This Appeal Precludes Sampson 
From Sustaining His Burden Of Demonstrating That The 
District C o u r t s Factual Findings On This Issue Were 
Clearly Erroneous. 
Sampson argues in his brief that the district court 
erred in concluding that Sampson's takeover of the Limited 
Partnerships was actuated by an improper purpose because 
there are "...no factual findings nor evidence to justify 
this conclusion." (Brief, p. 3 4 ) . The determination of 
malice in arriving at its conclusion that Sampson used a 
series of improper means to take control of the Limited 
Partnerships. Finally, Sampson's reliance on a standard 
of "good faith" appears to be nothing more than an 
assertion that he was legally privileged to carry out 
the conduct that he did. His effort to cast his 
argument in those terms is understandable in light of 
his failure to plead privilege as an affirmative defense 
in his reply to the Richins Parties' second amended 
counterclaim. (R. 1656-63). That failure, of course, 
constitutes a waiver of that affirmative defense and 
cannot now be raised for the first time on appeal. Utah 
R. Civ. P., 12(h); Manger v. Davis, 619 P.2d 687 (Utah 
1980). 
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w h e t h e r t h e r e is s u f f i c i e n t " e v i d e n c e " s u p p o r t i n g the 
district court's decision cannot be made on the basis of the 
partial record available to the court. See, Arguments I and 
II, sup ra. Absent the complete record, there is no possible 
way to d e t e r m i n e whether the factual findings on this issue 
are "clearly e r r o n e o u s " w i t h i n the m e a n i n g of R u l e 5 2 ( a ) 
and the cases interpreting it. 
B. T h e E x i s t i n g R e c o r d A b u n d a n t l y S u p p o r t s The D i s t r i c t 
Court's Conclusion That Sampson s Seizure Of The Limited 
Partnerships Was Actuated By An Improper P u r p o s e . 
In c o n s i d e r i n g and a n a l y z i n g the massive evidence 
establishing Sampson's use of improper means in intruding in 
the a f f a i r s of the L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p s , S e e , p p . 3 6 - 3 9 , 
supra, the district court had before it substantial evidence 
justifying the eminently reasonable inference that: 
. . . t h e e v i d e n c e d o e s m a k e c l e a r that 
Sampson's main goal and effort soon became 
o n e of g e t t i n g rid of R i c h i n s from all 
partnerships and obtaining control thereof 
for himself and his clients w h o m he n e v e r 
f u l l y s p e c i f i c a l l y i d e n t i f i e d . I think 
the evidence shows, and so f i n d , that his 
s e l f - d e c l a r e d b e n e v o l e n t m o t i v e soon 
changed to one of greed and a v e n d e t t a to 
oust Richins and take complete c o n t r o l . 
(R. 2159) . 
Obviously, the issue of whether an improper purpose 
h a s , in any g i v e n c a s e , been e s t a b l i s h e d r e q u i r e s that 
i n f e r e n c e s be drawn from the underlying conduct. Like most 
c a s e s , t h e r e c o r d in t h i s c a s e d o e s not c o n t a i n a f r a n k 
a d m i s s i o n by the tortfeasor that he had an improper purpose 
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in mind while engaging in the conduct deemed to be action-
able. That purpose can only be deduced from the determined 
facts. That is precisely what the district court did. Its 
conclusion on this issue must be sustained. 
ARGUMENT V 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT 
SAMPSON'S CONDUCT PROXIMATELY CAUSED 
INJURY TO THE RICHINS PARTIES 
A. Sampson's Conduct Was A Substantial Factor In Causing 
Injury To The Richins Parties. 
In his brief, Sampson asserts that even assuming 
his conduct was carried out through improper means or by an 
improper purpose, he is nevertheless insulated from liabil-
ity because he was not the proximate cause of injury to the 
Richins Parties. Specifically, he suggests that the 
district court should have applied a "but for" test of 
causation. (Brief, p. 42). That assertion, however, badly 
misconceives the legal standard of proximate cause applica-
ble to t hi s case . 
The district court expressly concluded that it was 
a combination of the Richins Parties' supposed negligence 
(mismanagement) and Sampson's tortious conduct that "brought 
this case to court for a decision as to whether any damages 
are recoverable..." (R. 2275). Thus, the district court 
concluded that the conduct of the Richins Parties and 
Sampson were concurrent causes of the complained-of injuries 
-- that is, that either of the causes, operating alone, 
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w o u l d h a v e been s u f f i c i e n t to result in the R i c h t r o n 
Companies 1 inability to e n j o y the b e n e f i t s of the L i m i t e d 
P a r t n e r s h i p a g r e e m e n t s . As s u c h , S a m p s o n ' s c o n d u c t is 
deemed to be the legal cause of that injury "...if it was a 
m a t e r i a l e l e m e n t and a s u b s t a n t i a l f a c t o r in bringing it 
a b o u t . " W. P. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts §41 at 
240 (4th E d . 1 9 7 1 ) . T h u s , "if a defendant's conduct was a 
substantial f a c t o r in c a u s i n g the p l a i n t i f f ' s i n j u r y , it 
f o l l o w s that he will not be absolved from liability merely 
because other causes have contributed to the r e s u l t , s i n c e 
such causes, innumerable, are always present." Id. 
Clearly, the nature and extent of Sampson's efforts 
to d i s p l a c e the R i c h t r o n C o m p a n i e s and insert h i m s e l f as 
t h e i r s u c c e s s o r easily rise to the level of being a "mater-
ial element and a substantial factor" within the m e a n i n g of 
a p p l i c a b l e case l a w . H o w e v e r badly managed Sampson would 
like to b e l i e v e the L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p s w e r e , he c a n n o t 
v a l i d l y c o n t e n d that his conduct was anything other than a 
substantial factor in bringing about injury to the R i c h t r o n 
C o m p a n i e s . S t a n d i n g a l o n e , each of the improper means of 
tortious interference found by the district court constitute 
a m a t e r i a l e l e m e n t and s u b s t a n t i a l f a c t o r in the i n j u r y 
inflicted on the Richtron Companies. When a g g r e g a t e d , they 
c o n s t i t u t e an o v e r w h e l m i n g body of e v i d e n c e that t h o s e 
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i n j u r i e s w e r e not proximately caused by anything other than 
Sampson's conduct. 
B. E v e n A p p l i c a t i o n Of T h e " But F o r " Test S u p p o r t s The 
C o n c l u s i o n That S a m p s o n ' s T o r t i o u s C o n d u c t Was The 
Proximate Cause of Injury To The Richtron C o m p a n i e s . 
In the event it is d e t e r m i n e d that the d i s t r i c t 
court a p p l i e d a "but f o r " test of p r o x i m a t e c a u s e , it is 
c l e a r that its f a c t u a l f i n d i n g s a d e q u a t e l y s u p p o r t the 
conclusion that Sampson's conduct was the proximate cause of 
the Richtron Companies' injuries. 
At the o u t s e t , it is i m p o r t a n t to r e c o g n i z e that 
the f a c t u a l f i n d i n g s set forth by S a m p s o n in his b r i e f 
represent only one side of the proximate cause equation, and 
an i n c o m p l e t e one at t h a t . The only two relevant factual 
f i n d i n g s relied upon by S a m p s o n to support his conclusion 
that he is not the f a c t u a l and p r o x i m a t e c a u s e of the 
Ri c h i n s P a r t i e s ' i n j u r i e s is (i) the fact that the Limited 
P a r t n e r s h i p s 1 agreements were t e r m i n a b l e at w i l l , and (ii) 
the "fact" that the Limited Partnerships were suffering from 
"financial i n s t a b i l i t y . " ( B r i e f , p . 4 0 ) . H o w e v e r , what 
S a m p s o n f a i l s to r e c o g n i z e is that the terminability of a 
contract is a factor that has relevance only with respect to 
the issue of d a m a g e s . As the Restatement (Second) of T o r t s , 
§7 66(g ) makes clear: 
A s i m i l a r s i t u a t i o n [to v o i d a b l e c o n -
t r a c t s ] e x i s t s w i t h a c o n t r a c t t h a t , by 
its t e r m s or otherwise, permits the third 
person to terminate the agreement at w i l l . 
Until he has so t e r m i n a t e d it, the 
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c o n t r a c t is valid and subsisting, and the 
defendant may not properly i n t e r f e r e with 
it. The fact that the c o n t r a c t is 
t e r m i n a b l e at w i l l , h o w e v e r , is to be 
t a k e n into a c c o u n t in d e t e r m i n i n g the 
d a m a g e s the p l a i n t i f f has s u f f e r e d by 
reason of its breach. 
T h u s , the mere fact that the contract is t e r m i n a b l e at will 
has no r e l e v a n c e to the issue of w h e t h e r , and to what 
e x t e n t , the p r o m i s e e ' s right to p e r f o r m a n c e has been 
impaired by the third party's tortious interference. 
N e x t , even c h a r i t a b l y a s s u m i n g for p u r p o s e s of 
a r g u m e n t that the Limited Partnerships were in fact suffer-
ing from "financial instability" on the d a t e S a m p s o n first 
a p p e a r e d on the s c e n e , it is essential that that "fact" be 
placed in proper context. For example, the Limited Partner-
ships had been solvent, viable entities for over seven years 
by the t i m e S a m p s o n first began t a m p e r i n g with t h e i r 
a f f a i r s . (R. 2 0 6 8 , 2 1 2 8 - 2 9 , 2 2 2 8 ) . In addition, there is 
no e v i d e n c e that any of the c o n t r a c t s u n d e r w h i c h the 
R i c h t r o n Companies were purchasing the farm properties were 
ever foreclosed upon. Indeed, the inference is irresistible 
that any default in the performance of those obligations was 
timely cured b e c a u s e the court p r o p e r l y found that w h i l e 
they w e r e u n d e r the s u p e r v i s i o n of the Richtron Companies, 
none of the farm properties were ever foreclosed upon. Id. 
All of the p r o p e r t i e s w e r e , h o w e v e r , f o r e c l o s e d upon or 
otherwise lost under Sampson's reign. Id. 
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Moreover, under the Limited Partnership a g r e e m e n t s , 
the limited p a r t n e r s w e r e c o n t r a c t u a l l y o b l i g a t e d to pay 
t h e i r pro rata p o r t i o n of al 1 e x p e n s e s i n c u r r e d by the 
L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p s * ( E x h i b i t 1 1 5 ) . T h e r e f o r e , the 
continued ability of the Limited Partnerships to operate and 
u l t i m a t e l y p e r s e v e r e d e p e n d e d in the final a n a l y s i s upon 
the w i l l i n g n e s s of t h e l i m i t e d p a r t n e r s to pay t h e i r p r o 
rata p o r t i o n of t h o s e e x p e n s e s . O b v i o u s l y , an event like 
S a m p s o n ' s u n l a w f u l s o l i c i t a t i o n and s e i z u r e of l i m i t e d 
p a r t n e r f u n d s had t h e e f f e c t of c h o k i n g off all cash flow 
available to the Limited P a r t n e r s h i p s . When c o u p l e d w i t h 
his repeated statements that the Richtron Companies were not 
entitled to be repaid t h e i r a d v a n c e s and that t h e l i m i t e d 
p a r t n e r s w e r e not obligated to honor their agreement to pay 
the R i c h t r o n C o m p a n i e s any " m a r k - u p , " it is a r e a s o n a b l e 
c o n c l u s i o n , as the d i s t r i c t c o u r t so determined, that any 
"financial instability" was c r e a t e d , e x p l o i t e d and e x a c e r -
b a t e d by S a m p s o n . T h e l o n g - s t a n d i n g v i a b i l i t y of the 
L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p s and t h e i r a b i l i t y to o b t a i n all 
r e q u i r e d o p e r a t i n g c a p i t a l from the investors (and thereby 
fund any o p e r a t i n g d e f i c i t s ) m i l i t a t e s s t r o n g l y a g a i n s t 
S a m p s o n ' s a s s e r t i o n that he is not legally responsible for 
injuries to the Richtron C o m p a n i e s . 
In a d d i t i o n , and perhaps most importantly, however 
"financially i n s t a b l e , " the L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p s may h a v e 
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been as o f May, 1 9 8 0 , Sampson and h i s two 1 i m i t e d p a r t n e r 
c l i e n t s a g r e e d t h a t t h e v a l u e o f t h e R i c h t r o n C o m p a n i e s ' 
c a p i t a l s t o c k a t t h a t t i m e was at l e a s t $ 7 0 0 , 0 0 0 . (R. 2049, 
2 0 7 7 - 7 8 , 2 1 4 4 , 2 2 7 0 ) . Because t h e p r i m a r y v a l u e o f t h a t 
s t o c k was based upon t h e R i c t r o n Companies ' i n t e r e s t i n t he 
L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p s , i t i s a r easonab l e i n f e r e n c e t h a t t h e 
g o i n g concern va lue of t h e L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p s was s u b s t a n -
t i a l . As t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t n o t e d : 
As f l o u n d e r i n g as t h e p a r t n e r s h i p s we re , 
Sampson saw v a l u e t h e r e and spent what now 
t o t a l s s i x y e a r s i n a c h i e v i n g what he now 
h a s , wha teve r i t may b e , l e a v i n g R i c h i n s 
and h i s compan ies w i t h no t a n g i b l e asse ts 
or va lues . 
(R . 2275) 
F i n a l l y , i t i s c r u c i a l t o unde rs tand t h a t each of 
t h e f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s set f o r t h by Sampson on page 41 
of h i s b r i e f r e l a t e o n l y t o Sampson's l i a b i l i t y f o r i n j u r i e s 
and damages i n f l i c t e d on Ri c h t r o n F i n a n c i a l - - an e n t i t y t o 
whom t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t g r a n t e d on l y nomina l damages i n t he 
amount o f $ 1 0 0 . 0 0 . The d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s a r t i c u l a t e d 
c o n c e r n s r e g a r d i n g t h e l i m i t e d n a t u r e o f l e g a l i n j u r y t o 
R i c h t r o n F i n a n c i a l i s w h o l l y i r r e l e v a n t t o e v a l u a t i n g t h e 
e x t e n s i v e e x t e n t t o w h i c h t h e o t h e r R i c h t r o n C o m p a n i e s , 
R i c h t r o n , I n c . and R i c h t r o n G e n e r a l , were i n j u r e d and 
damaged. 
A c c o r d i n g l y , t h e r e c o r d e s t a b l i s h e s t h a t but f o r 
Sampson's s e i z u r e o f t h e L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p s , t h e R i c h t r o n 
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Companies would have obtained the various economic benefits 
embodied by the Limited Partnership agreements. The 
district court's conclusion to that effect should be 
affi rmed . 
ARGUMENT VI 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDINGS REGARDING 
WAIVER AND ESTOPPEL ARE UNASSAILABLE 
In asserting that the district court improperly 
concluded that the Richins Parties did not waive or are 
estopped from complaining about Sampson's conduct, Sampson 
has failed to marshal! all evidence relevant to that finding 
and to establish that even in the face of such evidence, the 
district court erred in reaching the conclusions that it 
did. Therefore, appellate review of that contention cannot 
be undertaken. 
ARGUMENT VII 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY AWARDED TO THE 
RICHINS PARTIES DAMAGES OF MORE THAN $285,000.00 
Sampson a s s e r t s i n t h i s a p p e a l t h a t t he d i s t r i c t 
c o u r t e r r e d i n award ing $250 ,000 .00 i n c o n s e q u e n t i a l damages 
t o R i c h t r o n , I n c . and R i c h t r o n G e n e r a l , $ 3 1 , 0 7 4 . 5 0 i n 
s p e c i a l damages i n f a v o r o f R i c h t r o n F i n a n c i a l , and 
$ 4 , 2 2 2 . 5 0 i n s p e c i a l damages i n f a v o r o f R i c h t r o n , I n c . As 
d e m o n s t r a t e d b e l o w , ( i ) Sampson ' s i n c l u s i o n o f o n l y a 
f r a c t i o n o f t h e t r i a l t r a n s c r i p t p r e c l u d e s him f rom c h a l -
l e n g i n g t h e damage awards and , ( i i ) t o t h e e x t e n t t h e c o u r t 
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e l e c t s to c o n s i d e r his c l a i m e d a s s i g n m e n t of e r r o r , the 
district court's f i n d i n g s of f a c t , c o n c l u s i o n s of law and 
judgment on that issue are unassailable. 
A. The A b s e n c e Of The C o m p l e t e Trial R e c o r d Is Fatal To 
S a m p s o n ' s C h a l l e n g e To The D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s Award Of 
Damages . 
In asking the court to reverse the district court's 
damage award, Sampson asserts g e n e r a l l y that the award was 
" . . . w i t h o u t any e v i d e n t i a r y b a s i s . " ( B r i e f , p . 5 2 ) . * 1 
H o w e v e r , the " e v i d e n t i a r y b a s i s " on w h i c h his appeal of 
d a m a g e s is based is hopelessly incomplete. Numerous courts 
have held that an a p p e l l a n t ' s f a i l u r e to p r o d u c e the 
t r a n s c r i p t of all e v i d e n c e bearing on the issue of damages 
p r e c l u d e s it from o b t a i n i n g a p p e l l a t e r e v i e w . Herron v. 
R o z e l l e , 480 F.2d 2 8 2 , 288 (10th Cir. 1973) ("Appellant has 
f a i l e d to b r i n g up a transcript of all evidence bearing on 
the issue of d a m a g e s to him. We d e c l i n e r e v i e w s i n c e we 
c a n n o t m a k e a m e a n i n g f u l e v a l u a t i o n of the c l a i m of 
e r r o r . " ) ; Grimard v. Carlston, 567 F.2d 1171, 1173 (1st Cir. 
1 9 7 8 ) ( W h e r e the court lacked a record of the lower court's 
denial of a motion for preliminary injunction, the s u f f i c i -
ency of t h o s e p r o c e e d i n g s w o u l d not be r e v i e w e d b e c a u s e 
11
 He further asserts in his brief that "as to the issue of 
d a m a g e s . . . t h e r e is n e i t h e r e v i d e n t i a r y s u p p o r t nor 
s u f f i c i e n t f i n d i n g s to support the award." (Brief, p. 
5 ) . For the r e a s o n s set forth in A r g u m e n t I a b o v e , 
f u r t h e r a p p e l l a t e r e v i e w of the d a m a g e s issue is 
impossibly speculative. 
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t h e r e was no way of saying in the a b s e n c e of that record 
whether the court abused its discretion,) 
For that reason alone, the court should decline to 
review Sampson's challenge to the district court's award of 
damages and affirm its judgment. 
B. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s Award Of Consequential Damages To 
R i c h t r o n Inc. And R i c h t r o n General In The Amount Of 
$ 2 5 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 Is C o n s i s t e n t With A p p l i c a b l e Law And" 
Abundantly Supported By The Existing Record On Appeal. 
S a m p s o n argues that the $ 2 5 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 award of 
consequential damages to Richtron, Inc. and Richtron General 
should be reversed for several reasons. The first reason he 
advances is that the district court r e f r a i n e d from i d e n t i -
fying the p r e c i s e c o m p o s i t i o n of the $ 2 5 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 figure. 
S a m p s o n argues that the d i s t r i c t court was r e q u i r e d to 
provide that information because the district court's use of 
the term " c o n s e q u e n t i a l " i s , he b e l i e v e s , t a n t a m o u n t to 
" s p e c i a l " d a m a g e s . ( B r i e f , pp. 5 2 , 5 3 ) . H o w e v e r , in 
a d v a n c i n g that a r g u m e n t , S a m p s o n fails to adhere to the 
s p e c i f i c d i s t i n c t i o n s e n u n c i a t e d by the d r a f t e r s of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 7 7 4 A t h a t : 
(1) One who is liable to a n o t h e r for 
interference with a c o n t r a c t or p r o s p e c -
tive c o n t r a c t u a l relation is l i a b l e for 
d a m a g e s for (a) the pecuniary loss of the 
b e n e f i t s of a contract or the prospective 
r e l a t i o n ; (b) c o n s e q u e n t i a l losses for 
which the interference is the legal cause; 
and (c) emotional distress or actual harm 
to r e p u t a t i o n , if they are r e a s o n a b l y 
expected to result from the interference. 
(Emphasi s added ) . 
-50-
C l e a r l y , s u b p a r a g r a p h (a) of §774A is referring to special 
damages when it uses the term "pecuniary loss." By the same 
t o k e n , s u b p a r a g r a p h ( b ) , in using the term "consequential 
losses," appears to denote general damages that are d e e m e d 
to flow n a t u r a l l y and necessarily, albeit indirectly, from 
the harm d o n e . I n d e e d , the d i c t i o n a r y d e f i n i t i o n of 
"consequential damages" is that they are damages that do not 
flow directly and immediately from the act of the party, but 
only from some of the consequences or a result of such act. 
B l a c k ' s Law Dictionary, p. 457 (4th edition 1 9 6 8 ) . That is 
the s e n s e in w h i c h the d i s t r i c t court intended to use the 
term. (R. 2 2 6 1 ) . 
N u m e r o u s o t h e r c o u r t s have used the term "conse-
q u e n t i a l " in the same w a y . S t a t e of M a r y l a n d for use of 
Pumphrey v. Manor Real Estate and Trust Co., 83 F. Supp. 91, 
102 (D. Md. 1938) (Consequential damages are those which the 
cause in question naturally but indirectly p r o d u c e s . ) ; Deetz 
v. C o b b s and M i t c h e l l C o . , 120 O r . 6 0 0 , 253 P. 5 4 2 , 544 
( 1 9 3 5 ) ( C o n s e q u e n t i a l damages are those that follow natur-
ally, but indirectly, from a wrongful a c t . ) . 
It would appear that the district court's choice of 
the term "consequential" in defining the damages recoverable 
by the R i c h i n s Parties was intended only to denote that the 
d a m a g e s , w h i l e f l o w i n g n a t u r a l l y from S a m p s o n ' s t o r t i o u s 
c o n d u c t , only i n d i r e c t l y c a u s e d the l o s s . The c o n t e x t 
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w i t h i n w h i c h that term is used is i n c o m p a t i b l e with the 
n o t i o n that the d i s t r i c t court i n t e n d e d to award the 
f u n c t i o n a l equivalent of special damages for which specific 
proof of precise loss would be required. 
N e x t , S a m p s o n fails to recognize that the district 
court is not required to calibrate w i t h a b s o l u t e p r e c i s i o n 
the a m o u n t of d a m a g e s to be a w a r d e d . As this c o u r t has 
consi stently hel d: 
Although an award of damages based only on 
s p e c u l a t i o n c a n n o t be u p h e l d , it is 
g e n e r a l l y r e c o g n i z e d that some degree of 
u n c e r t a i n t y in the e v i d e n c e of d a m a g e s 
will not s u f f i c e to r e l i e v e a d e f e n d a n t 
from recompensing a wronged plaintiff. As 
long as there is some rational basis for a 
damage award, it is the wrongdoer who must 
assume the risk of uncertainty. (Emphasis 
added) . 
B a s t i a n v. King, 661 P.2d 953, 956 (Utah 1 9 8 3 ) ; Winsness v. 
M. J. C o n o c o D i s t r i b u t o r s , 593 P.2d 1303 (Utah 1 9 7 9 ) . And, 
" w h e r e t h e r e is evidence of the fact of damage, a defendant 
may not e s c a p e l i a b i l i t y b e c a u s e the a m o u n t of d a m a g e s 
c a n n o t be p r o v e d w i t h p r e c i s i o n . " 661 P.2d at 956. That 
principle has also been expressed as follows: 
O n c e a d e f e n d a n t has been shown to have 
caused a loss, he should not be allowed to 
escape liability because the amount of the 
loss c a n n o t be p r o v e d with p r e c i s i o n , 
[ c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d ] C o n s e q u e n t l y , the 
reasonable level of certainty r e q u i r e d to 
e s t a b l i s h the a m o u n t of a loss is gener-
ally lower than that required to establish 
the fact or cause of a loss. 
Cook A s s o c i a t e s , Inc. v. Warnick, 664 P.2d 1161 (Utah 1 9 8 3 ) . 
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When evaluated in the light of those principles, it 
is clear that the district court's award of c o n s e q u e n t i a l 
d a m a g e s in the amount of $250,000.00 has a "rational basis" 
in the existing record. S p e c i f i c a l l y , the d i s t r i c t court 
e x p r e s s l y found and c o n c l u d e d that the date on which the 
f e d e r a l d i s t r i c t court v o i d e d the IRS tax sale on w h i c h 
S a m p s o n based his claim of interest in the Limited Partner-
ships -- May 16, 1984 -- " e n d e d then and t h e r e " S a m p s o n ' s 
right to take "...any further steps in the winding up of any 
affairs of the partnerships in which the Richtron C o m p a n i e s 
r e m a i n e d as g e n e r a l p a r t n e r . " (R. 2 2 3 1 ) . The court then 
o b s e r v e d that d e s p i t e the entry of that o r d e r , S a m p s o n 
" u n d a u n t i n g l y " ^2 c o n t i n u e d from that point to collect and 
r e c e i v e a d d i t i o n a l l i m i t e d p a r t n e r m o n i e s w h i c h , as of 
October 29, 1984 (the last day for which the Richins Parties 
were able to obtain Sampson's a c c o u n t i n g r e c o r d s ) t o t a l l e d 
$ 2 8 8 , 5 9 7 . 0 0 -- $ 2 4 5 , 5 9 7 . 0 0 of w h i c h were contained in the 
C o n s o l i d a t e d F a r m s a c c o u n t and $ 4 3 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 of w h i c h w e r e 
c o n t a i n e d in the Ag M a n a g e m e n t a c c o u n t . (R. 2229, 2263, 
2 2 7 6 ) . Immediately after rendering its c o n c l u s i o n s r e g a r d -
ing S a m p s o n ' s u n l a w f u l c o l l e c t i o n and retention of those 
monies after the federal court o r d e r , the court c o n c l u d e d 
that the R i c h i n s P a r t i e s had e s t a b l i s h e d d a m a g e s "of at 
least a consequential nature" that had been established with 
12 R. 2276. 
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"...a r e a s o n a b l e d e g r e e of certainty by a preponderance of 
the evidence." (R. 2 2 7 6 ) . 
T h e r e f o r e , in f i x i n g the Rich ins Parties' damages 
at $250,000.00, the court had before it an eminently certain 
b a s i s for f i x i n g t h o s e d a m a g e s -- the aggregate amount of 
all monies collected and retained by Sampson after entry and 
in v i o l a t i o n of the f e d e r a l court o r d e r . T h u s , the 
$250,000.00 damage award s u f f e r s from n o n e of the lack of 
p r e c i s i o n of w h i c h S a m p s o n complains. It has an abundantly 
"rational basis" in the record and cannot be overturned. 
C. The L o w e r Court P r o p e r l y Awarded To Richtron, Inc. And 
R i c h t r o n F i n a n c i a l D a m a g e s A r i s i n g From S a m p s o n ' s 
T e r m i n a t i o n Of T h e i r L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p I n t e r e s t In 
Several Of The Limited Partnerships. 
The d i s t r i c t court p r o p e r l y awarded $30,974.50 to 
R i c h t r o n F i n a n c i a l to c o m p e n s a t e it for the loss of its 
l i m i t e d p a r t n e r i n t e r e s t in t h r e e of the Limited Partner-
ships and $4,222.50 to Richtron, I n c . to c o m p e n s a t e it for 
its loss in one of the Limited Partnerships. (R. 2087-88, 
2239, 2272, 2 2 7 7 ) . The sole basis on which Sampson seeks to 
r e v e r s e that award is that t h e r e is s u p p o s e d l y " . . . n o 
showing by [the Richins P a r t i e s ] that at the time S a m p s o n 
took o v e r the o p e r a t i o n of the p a r t n e r s h i p s that t h e i r 
original c a p i t a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s w e r e at the same v a l u e as 
when they w e r e i n i t i a l l y c o n t r i b u t e d . " ( B r i e f , p. 5 5 ) . 
That assertion is contradicted by the record. The d i s t r i c t 
court specifically determined that Sampson filed various tax 
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returns for the Limited Partnerships for the tax year ending 
December 3 1 , 1 9 8 0 . (R. 2 0 8 7 - 8 8 ) . T h o s e returns c l e a r l y 
r e f l e c t e d R i c h t r o n F i n a n c i a l ' s capital interest in the 
Catlow L i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p s in the amount of $ 1 0 , 2 1 2 . 0 0 . 
I d. T h e r e f o r e , S a m p s o n ' s own documents establish the then 
e x i s t i n g value of R i c h t r o n Financial's capital interest in 
those partnerships. 
In addition, Sampson asks the court in his brief to 
c o n s i d e r that the C a t l o w Limited P a r t n e r s h i p s were in 
f o r e c l o s u r e in May, 1980 and that an additional $240,000.00 
had to be raised to save the property. (Brief, p. 5 5 ) . He 
t h e r e b y implies that the value of those, and perhaps other, 
partnerships was worthless. However, in a letter dated June 
2 6 , 1 9 8 1 , S a m p s o n informed the limited partners that: "as 
far as the p r o p e r t i e s are c o n c e r n e d , all except p e r h a p s 
K a n o s h , are in as good or better shape than ever before." 13 
Therefore, Sampson's own admissions to the limited p a r t n e r s 
v a l i d a t e and give c r e d e n c e to the values determined by the 
district court. Those valuations should not be modified. 
CONCLUSION 
For t h e f o r e g o i n g r e a s o n s , t h e Cour t shou ld a f f i r m 
t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s judgment and t h e r e b y enab le t h e R i c h i n s 
T h a t e x h i b i t i s a l s o c o n t a i n e d i n t h e m i s s i n g box of 
documents d e s c r i b e d at n . 2 s u p r a . 
-55-
P a r t i e s to be c o m p e n s a t e d for at least a portion of their 
extensi ve 1osses • 
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